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FAME, THE FOUNDING, AND THE POWER TO 
DECLARE WAR 
William Michael Treanor!" 
Almost without discussion, and essentially without opposition, the 
Framers and Ratifiers of the United States Constitution vested in Con-
gress the "Power ... To declare War, [and] grant Letters of Marque 
and Reprisal." 1 During the past fifty years, one of the fiercest contro-
versies in constitutional law has concerned what the Founders meant 
by this grant. It is a debate that has had, and that continues to have, 
dramatic importance. When Presidents committed troops or pre-
pared to commit ~oops in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Iraq, 
Somalia, Haiti, and, most recently, Bosnia, they claimed that the Con-
stitution did not require them to seek explicit congressional approval 
for their actions. In each instance, critics proclaimed the Presidents' 
actions unconstitutional.2 When Congress sought to control presiden-
tial warmaking by passing the War Powers Act of 1973,3 defenders of 
the statute declared that it simply tracked the War Powers Clause. 
Presidents, however, have repeatedly claimed that the statute violates 
the Constitution, because they believe the War Powers Clause grants 
Congress only limited powers.4 The same question has been at issue 
on each occasion: Does the Constitution give Congress alone the 
power to initiate conflict? 
t Associate Professor, Fordham Law School. B.A., Yale, 1979; AM., Hruvard, 1982; 
J.D., Yale, 1985. In writing this Article, I accumulated substantial intellectual debts. I par-
ticularly thank Tom Alpert, Akhil Amar, Mary Sarah Bilder, Victor Brudney, Bill Casto, 
Bryce Denno, Debby Denno, Christine Desan, Neil Devins, Jill Fisch, Terry Fisher, Martin 
Flaherty, Jim Fleming, Abner Greene, Tracy Higgins, Morton Horwitz, Jim Kainen, Laura 
Kalman, John McGinnis, Greg Mark,JudgeJohn Noonan, Jack Rakove,John Phillip Reid, 
Dan Richman, Howard Shapiro, Terry Smith, Gene Sperling, Lloyd Weinreb, John Yoo, 
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1 u.s. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
2 These controversies concerning presidential warmaking are discussed infra Part 
I.A. 
3 50 u.s.c. §§ 1541-48 (1994). 
4 For a discussion of the debate concerning the War Powers Resolution, see infra Part 
I.A. 
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The roster of scholars engaged in the controversy over the origi-
nal understanding of the warmaking power reads like a who's who of 
constitutional scholars and scholars of foreign affairs.5 On one side of 
the debate-the pro-Congress side-are such academics as Raoul Ber-
ger,6 Alexander Bickel,7 John Hart Ely, a Louis Fisher,9 Harold Koh,10 
Leonard Levy,11 Charles Lofgren,I2 Arthur Schlesinger,Jr.,13 and Wil-
liam Van Alstyne.I 4 They have argued that the original understanding 
5 This Article approaches the question of original understanding from two perspec-
tive~. First, in light of the ongoing academic and political debate about the original under-
standing of the War Powers Clause-a debate in which the relevance of the original 
understanding is often treated as a given-the Article re-examines the question of what the 
Founders intended. Second, wholly apart from whether the original understanding is 
binding as a matter of constitutional law, the Article asks whether the original understand-
ing of the War Powers Clause is sensible in today's world, and whether we can learn any-
thing from the Founders' concerns. For further discussion, see infra Part IV. The 
underlying jurisprudential question of the extent to which the original understanding 
binds modern interpretations of the Constitution is discussed in these contexts, but it is 
not a separate focus of the Article. The discussion of the significance of original intent 
builds on and synthesizes earlier writings of mine discussing some particular part of the 
original understanding question. See William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners 
and the Origins of judicial Review, 143 U. PA. L. RF:v. 491, 544-56 (1994) [hereinafter 
Treanor,judicial Review] (describing significance of original understanding to Founders in 
construing Constitution); William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings 
Clause and the Politfcal Process, 95 CoLUM. L. fu:v. 782, 855-80 (1995) [hereinafter Treanor, 
Takings Clause] (arguing for translation model of original understanding); William M. 
Treanor, Taking the Framers Seriously, 55 U. CHI. L. RF:v. 1016, 1023-40 (1988) [hereinafter 
Treanor, Framers] (book review) (explaining the relevance of Founders' worldview); Wil-
liam M. Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overrnling and the Revival of "Unconstitu-
tional" Statutes, 93 CoLuM. L. REv. 1902, 1942-43 (1993) (analyzing original understanding 
and changing constitutional meaning). 
6 See Raoul Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. RF:v. 29 (1972). 
7 See Alexander M. Bickel, Congress, the President and the Power to Wage War, 48 CHI.-
KENT L. RF:v. 131 (1971). 
8 See jOHN HART ELY, WAR AND REsPONSIBIUIY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAJ\1 
AND ITS AF'n:RMATH 3-10, 139-52 (1993). 
9 See LoUis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR PowER (1995). 
10 See HAROLD HoNGJU KoH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CoNSTITUTION: SHARING PowER 
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 74-77 (1990). 
II See LEONARD W. LEw, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAJ\1ERS' CoNSTITUTION 30-53 
(1988). 
12 See Charles A. Lofgren, On War-Making; Original Intent, and Ultra-Whiggery, 21 VAI .. 
U. L. RF:v. 53 (1986); Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original 
Understanding, 81 YALE LJ. 672 (1972) [hereinafter Lofgren, Understanding]. 
13 See ARTHUR M. ScHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 1-26 (1973). 
I4 See William Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare War: A Re-
quiem for Vtetnam, 121 U. PA. L. RF:v. 1 (1972). For other leading accounts that are similar 
in approach to those mentioned in the text, see EDWARD KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR: TWI-
LIGHT ZoNE oF CoNSTITUTIONAL PoWER 31-40 (1982); W. TAYLOR REvELEY III, WAR PoWERS 
OF THE PRESIDENT AND CoNGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCH? 50-115 
(1981); ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORI-
GINS 25-38 (1976); FRANCIS D. WoRMUTH J:T AL., To CHAIN THE Doc oF WAR: THE WAR 
PoWER OF CoNGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAw 17-28 ( 1986); Arthur Bestor, Separatwn of Powers 
in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SETON 
HALL L. RF:v. 527, 555-613 (1974); Francis L. Coolidge,Jr. &Joel David Sharrow, The War-
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was that, except for a limited power to repel sudden attacks, the Presi-
dent could not commit troops to combat without congressional au-
thorization. They believe that modern constitutional law should 
reflect that understanding. In contrast, other scholars have adopted a 
pro-Executive stance. These include Phillip Bobbitt,15 Robert Bork,16 
Edward CorwinP Henry Monaghan,18 Eugene Rostow,19 Robert Tur-
ner,20 W. Michael Reisman,21 and John Yoo,22 among others.2s The 
pro-Executive scholars have argued either that the power to declare 
war was intended to be a very limite9, power-conferring on Congress 
the power to classify a conflict as a war for purposes of international 
law24 (rather than conferring on it the exclusive power to initiate con-
Making Powers: The Intenticns of the Framers in the Light of Parliamentary History, 50 B. U. L. REv. 
5 (special issue) (Spring, 1970); Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to 
Combat, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1771 (1968). 
15 See Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on john Hart Ely's War and Responsibility: 
Constitutional Lessons ofVu:tnam and its Aftermath, 92 MicH. L. REv. 1364, 1370-1388 (1994) 
(book review). 
16 See Robert Bork, Foreword to THE FmERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CoNSTRAINTS ON THE 
ExECUTIVE BRANCH at ix (L. Gordon Crovitz &Jeremy A Rabkin eds., 1989) [hereinafter 
Bork, Foreword]; Robert Bork, Erosion of the President's Power in Foreign Affairs, 68 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 693, 698 (1990) [hereinafter Bork, Erosion]. 
17 See EDWARDS. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 234, 256 
(5th ed. rev. 1984). 
IS See Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-making; 50 B.U. L. RI::v. 19 (special issue) 
(Spring, 1970). 
19 See Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEx. L. REv. 
833, 864-66 (1972) [hereinafter Rostow, Great Cases]; Eugene V. Rostow, "Once More unto the 
Breach:" The War Powers Resolution Revisited, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1986) [hereinafter 
Rostow, Once More]. 
20 See RoBERT F. TuRNER, REPEALING THE WAR PowERS REsoLUTION: RESTORING THE 
RuLE OF LAw IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 80-81 (1991). 
21 See W. Michael Reisman, Some Lessons from Iraq: International Law and Democratic Poli-
tics, 16 YALE]. INT'L L. 203, 212 (1991). 
22 See john C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understand-
ing of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996). 
23 See, e.g.,]ohn Lehman, Making War: The 200-year-old Battle Between the President 
and Congress Over How America Goes to War 60 (1992); ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & 
AARON J. THOMAS, THE WAR-MAKING PoWERS OF THE PRESIDENT: CONSTITUTIONAl. AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAw AsrEcrs 8 (1982); Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, The 
Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet Nam, 75 YALE LJ. 1085, 1101 ( 1966) 
[hereinafter Office of the Legal Adviser];]. Terry Emerson, The War Powers Resolution 
Tested: The President's Independent Defense Power, 51 NoTRE DAME LAw. 187, 204-13 (1975) 
[hereinafter Emerson, War Powers Resolution];]. Terry Emerson, War Powers Legislation, 74 
W.VA. L. REV. 53, 72 (1971) [hereinafter Emerson, War Powers Legislation]; Patrick 0. 
Gudridge, Ely, Black, Grotius and Vattel, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 81 (1995}; Patrick D. Robbins, 
The War Powers Resolution After Fifteen Years: A Reassessment, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 141, 146-50 
(1988); William P. Rogers, Congress, the President, and the War Powers, 59 CAL. L. REV. 1194 
(1971); Lee A Casey & David B. Rivkin,Jr., In Constitutional Interpretation, Read the Framers' 
Words, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 3, 1994, at 24. 
24 See, e.g., Bobbitt, supra note 15, at 1375; Emerson, War Powers Resolution, supra note 
23, at 211-13; Rostow, Once More, supra note 19, at 6; Yoo, supra note 22, at 295. 
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flict)-or that, for reasons unique to the War Powers Clause, original 
understanding is irrelevant to resolution of modern controversies.25 
The debate has reached a point of stalemate. As Professor Ste-
phen Carter concluded, "[E]vidence concerning the original under-
standing ... does not come down firmly on one side or the other."26 
Although the evidence is limited-with the critical part of the consti-
tutional debates consisting of little more than a page of the published 
record27 and subject to various plausible readings-this is not the 
principal cause of the stalemate concerning the original understand-
ing. Rather, the problem is that neither side is able to square its 
claims fully with the evidence that exists. To the extent that the Foun-
ders made statements about the war power, those statements support 
the view that Congress alone has the power to initiate conflict.28 But 
pro-Executive scholars can plausibly counter that historical context 
strongly supports their position. The phrase "declare war" had a fixed 
meaning in international law; it did not mean to start war, but rather 
to classify a conflict as a war for legal purposes. Accordingly, prece-
dent in England and in this country suggests a "shared understand-
ing"29 that the Executive could start wars. To put it simply, the pro-
Executive position is that pro-Congress scholars have failed to explain 
why the Founders would have taken from the Executive the power to 
declare war. Given that failure, pro-Executive scholars argue that the 
intent of the great majority of the Founders to have the President pos-
sess the power to start war must be given effect, regardless of the belief 
of a handful of individuals that Congress alone has that power. 
There is, finally, one bit of evidence that neither side has ex-
plained convincingly. Numerous contemporaneous statements indi-
cate that the decision to declare war was purely a congressional 
matter, which means that the President could not veto declarations of 
war.30 This absence of a veto seems inconsistent with the view ofpro-
Congress scholars that the Founders sought to slow the path to war as 
much as possible. Yet it is also inconsistent with the pro-Executive 
view that the Founders were supportive of presidential involvement 
(and, generally, control) in all war matters. 
25 See, e.g., Bork, Erosion, supra note 16, at 698; Bork, Foreword, supra note 16, at x; 
Reisman, supra note 21, at 212; Rostow, Once More, supra note 19, at 48. 
26 Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. RI:.'V. 
101, Ill (1984). See also Bobbitt, supra note 15, at 1374 ("[U]nlike other constitutional 
disputes, the partisans [of competing positions on the clause] appear to find each of their 
own points decisive and dispute the validity of all of their opponents' claims .... "). 
27 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318-19 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1986) [hereinafter Farrand]. 
28 For discussion of the relevant statements, see infra Part I. C. 
29 Yoo, supra note 22, at 263. 
30 See infra text accompanying notes 181-201. 
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This Article breaks the stalemate by advancing an explanation for 
why the Founders would have wanted Congress alone to have the 
power to start war, the question that pro-Congress scholars have been 
unable to answer. In offering that explanation, the Article takes a dif- · 
ferent approach than previous work, which has, in accordance with 
the normal conventions of legal and constitutional scholarship, ex-
plored the original understanding by focusing on what the Founders 
said about the allocation of the war power, the constitutional struc-
ture, the language used, and prior practice. Although this Article uses 
evidence of this type, it also seeks to employ the approaches of intel-
lectual history, probing the structure of the founding generation's 
thoughts and the often implicit values that underlie the choices they 
made.31 In pursuing this project, it will look not merely at the tradi-
tional sources directly concerning original understanding, but, more 
generally, at how political leaders in the early republic talked about 
war, government, and individual motivation. 
This analysis brings to the forefront a subject of critical impor-
tance to the Framers as they created the Constitution, but one which 
constitutional law scholars have essentially ignored: the individual's 
desire to achieve immortal fame. Although the subject of the Fram-
ers' views of fame (using the term in the eighteenth century sense of 
one whom posterity Will remember as great) has yet to receive close, 
sustained study, a number of historians, and in particular the late 
Douglass Adair, have shoWn how the Framers' actions and their polit-
ical theory reflected their hope of achieving lasting renown. The 
Framers had, in Adair's words, "an almost obsessive desire for 
fame"32-and they believed that such a desire was a widely-shared 
31 Thus, there is a greater emphasis here on context and ideology than there is in 
standard legal history analyses of original understanding. My approach starts with the 
premise that, in determining who the founding generation thought should have the power 
to start war, it is helpful to look at their general views about war and human personality, 
rather than focusing exclusively on what they explicitly said about allocation of the 
warmaking power. This broader approach is particularly helpful here because the tradi-
tional sources are so slight. The difference between an historian's approach to interpretive 
questions and the approach traditionally used by legal scholars is incisively probed in 
LAuRA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LJBERALISM 167-236 (1996), and MartinS. 
Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE LJ. 1725, 1745-55 (1996). It should be 
noted, however, that when historians have turned to questions of legal history, they have 
generally applied the approach oflegal scholars, rather than that of intellectual historians. 
That is, they have devoted relatively little attention to ideology and context. The treatment 
of the original understanding of the War Powers Clause by Professor Lofgren, who is an 
historian, is an example of this practice. Although Lofgren's work is the most convincing 
treatment of the subject to date, it is still limited by the fact that it looks almost exclusively 
at the types of sources on which lawyers focus, such as statements about the War Powers 
Clause made at the constitutional convention and at the state ratifying conventions, Eng-
lish precedent, and early practice. See Lofgren, Understanding, supra note 12. 
32 DouGLASS ADAIR, Fame and the Founding Fathers, in FAME AND THE FouNDING FATHERS 
3, 7 (Trevor Colbourn ed., 1974). 
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trait. But these historians have not attempted to show the relationship 
between the Founders' view of fame and the constitutional structure 
that they created. Similarly, constitutional scholars have not ex-
amined the subject, either with respect to the War Powers Clause or 
the document as a whole. They have thus wholly ignored the way in 
which the Framers' ideas about fame shaped the Constitution, a disre-
gard which seriously distorts our perception of the original under-
standing. Piecing together sometimes implicit views, the Article 
argues that the allocation of the war power reflected the Framers' un-
derstanding of the desire for fame. The founding generation believed 
that, if the President could commit the nation to war, his desire for 
fame might lead him into war even when war was not in the national 
interest.33 By contrast, however, individual members of Congress 
would not win fame if the nation went to war and won. Therefore, 
Congress alone could be trusted to decide questions of war correctly. 
Animated by their concern that Presidents would fall prey to the lure 
of fame, the Founders thus structured the war power in a way that 
conflicts with the original understanding of the War Powers Clause as 
articulated by previous scholarship. The Founders intended that the 
clause would vest in Congress principal responsibility for initiating 
conflict; in this regard, pro-Congress scholars have been right and 
pro-Executive scholars wrong. But the Founders denied the President 
a veto over congressional decisions to wage war, something that all 
scholars have missed. 34 
Part I of the Article outlines the background against which this 
work is set. It discusses the post-World War II era's history of contro-
versies about presidential authority to initiate conflict, the current de-
bate among academics about the original understanding, and the 
ways in which the explanations that have been offered fail. Part II 
then begins the analysis of why Congress was given the sole power to 
start wars by discussing the Founders' conception of fame and the role 
of that conception in the constitutional order. Part III argnes that the 
Founders' concern that a President's desire for immortal fame would 
lead him to start wars that were not in the national interest, caused 
them to give Congress alone the power to start war. TI;tis Part begins 
with a close analysis of the way legislators spoke and wrote about war 
during the ratification debates. It then turns to the n~tion's first three 
crises involving the war power, focusing in each instance on how the 
desire for individual fame and the desire for war were linked in state-
ments from the period. Indeed, in one of the examined documents, 
James Madison explicitly states that Congress was given the power to 
start war because a President would use that power too aggressively in 
33 See infra Part III. 
34 See infra text accompanying notes 181-201, 380-81. 
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order to achieve fame.35 This statement from the most important 
Founder dramatically supports the thesis of this Article concerning 
the original understanding. 
Part N then explores the contemporary significance of the histor-
ical analysis. For originalists, the evidence offered here is important 
because it greatly strengthens the case for a pro-Congress reading of 
the Clause. It is also important because it suggests that the President 
should not be able to veto a declaration of war. 
. . 
The thesis of this Article is significant for nonoriginalists as well. 
Although it does not try to treat the matter conclusively, Part IV 
presents evidence th~t, ev~n though we no longer think of people as 
motivated by a thirst for fame in the eighteen~ century sense, Presi-
dents have, in fact, been so motivated. A range of historical accounts 
indicate that Presidents, in contemplating qu~stions of war, have been 
motivated by a desire for fame. That desire may, in part, explain why 
throughout our history Presidents have typically been more in favor of 
initiating wars than Congress. Recognition of the motivational stakes 
in the 'var powers area indicates that courts' current application of the 
political question doctrine to avoid resolution of war powers contro-
versies is misguided. Such a strategy rests on the false premise that 
this is an area in which Congress will struggle for control, when in fact 
this is an area in which Congress has an incentive to evade responsibil-
ity. More broadly, for nonoriginalists, recognition of the fact that the 
President has an incentive to favor war does not resolve the question 
of who should have the responsibility to decide questions of war. 
Rediscovery of the Founders' concern ultimately leads back to the two 
fundamental questions with which the Founders struggled and which 
have largely been forgotten: When does the desire for a place in his-
tory become dangerous? When does it, instead, inspire greatness? 
I 
THE DEBATE ABOUT THE WAR PoWERS CLAUSE 
The meaning of the War Powers Clause has long been the subject 
of bitter dispute, both in the realm of politics and in the realm of 
academia. This Part begins by presenting in summary fashion recent 
presidenti:il military actions and congressional responses. Strikingly, 
35 See james Madison, "Helvidius" Number 4, in 15 THE PAPERS OF jAMES MADISON 106, 
108 (Robert Rutland et al. eds., Virginia University Press 1985) [hereinafter MADISON PA-
PERS]. Madison wrote: 
It is in war, finally, that laurels are to be gathered, and it is the executive 
brow they are to encircle. The strongest passions, and most dangerous 
weaknesses of the human breast; . __ the honorable or venial love of fame, 
are all in conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace. 
ld. See also infra text accompanying notes 309-18. 
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the Executive has grown more, not less, aggressive in recent years.36 
The Part then discusses the two principal schools of academic thought 
concerning the meaning of the War Powers Clause. It focuses on the 
ways in which they treat the original understanding and its signifi-
cance, and concludes by discussing why neither school of thought has 
convincingly made its case. 
A. The Executive Branch and the War Power Since the Korean 
War 
Throughout most of this nation's history, Presidents did not 
claim that they could commit the nation to war without congressional 
authorization.37 In 1950, for the first time, the Executive explicitly 
took the position that it did not need congressional authorization to 
send troops abroad to fight.38 In justifying his decision to send 
United States troops into Korea, President Truman relied on a Secur-
ity Council resolution.39 Subsequently, after consulting with Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson, he decided not to seek congressional authori-
zation, but to rely on his powers as President and Commander in 
Chief.40 The Department of State issued a supporting memorandum 
oflaw.41 
PresidentJohnson's actions in Vietnam were, in contrast, almost 
modest. As in Korea, the Department of State formally took the posi-
tion that the President needed no congressional support to send 
troops into combat.42 Nonetheless, PresidentJohnson could plausibly 
claim that he had secured congressional approval for every stage of 
36 For example, President johnson had a legitimate claim to congressional authoriza-
tion for the Viemam War, while Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, in contrast, have 
repeatedly either sent troops into combat without congressional authorization or been pre-
pared to do so. See infra text accompanying notes 42-68. 
37 For relevant presidential statements, see REVELEY, supra note 14, at 277-85; THOMAS 
& THOMAS, supra note 23, at 31-35; Francis D. Wormuth, The Vzetnam War: The President 
versus the Constitution, in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 711 (Richard A Falk 
ed., 1969); Lawyer's Memorandum, Indochina: The Constitutional Crisis, 116 CoNG. REc. 
15,410-16 (1970). 
38 See ELY, supra note 8, at 10. 
39 See President Truman, U.S. Air and Sea Forces Ordered into Supporting Action 
Uune 27, 1950), in DEP'T ST. BuLL., july 3, 1950, at 5. 
40 See ScHLESINGER, supra note 13, at 131-33. 
41 Department of State Memorandum Authority of President to Repel the Attack in 
Korea Uuly 3, 1950), in DEP'T ST. BULL, july 31, 1950, at 173, 173 ("The President, as 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, has full control over the 
use thereof. ... [T]he President's power to send the Armed Forces outside the country is 
not dependent on Congressional authority .... "). 
42 See Office of the Legal Adviser, supra note 23, at 1101 ("The Constitution leaves to 
the President the judgment to determine whether the circumstances of a particular armed 
attack are so urgent and the potential consequences so threatening to the security of the 
United States that he should act without formally consulting the Congress."). 
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the Vietnam War through the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution;43 Congress's 
1967 declaration of "its firm intentions to provide all necessary sup-
port for members of the Armed Forces of the United States fighting in 
Vietnam";44 and congressional appropriation statutes.45 Significantly, 
Dean Ely and Professor Henkin, despite their general criticism of ex-
ecutive branch overreaching in warmaking, have found this claim of 
congressional approval convincing.46 
Recent history is very different. When President Reagan directed 
the invasion of Grenada in 1983, he simply acted "with respect to the 
conduct of foreign relations and as Commander-in-Chief of the 
United States Armed Forces"47 without subsequently seeking congres-
sional ratification of his actions.48 Similarly, in 1986, he unilaterally 
ordered the bombing of a number of targets in Libya pursuant to his 
power as Commander in Chief. 49 
President Bush continued this trend. Without seeking congres-
sional approval, he sent 24,000 troops into Panama to oust the govern-
ment of General Manuel Noriega. 5° Later, as the Bush administration 
prepared for the Gulf War, it initially took the position that it would 
not secure congressional approval.51 Although it ultimately reversed 
its course and obtained authorization for the commencement of hos-
tilities, 52 President Bush repeatedly proclaimed that he did not need 
that congressional sanction to send troops into combat. At one point 
he declared, "I didn't have to get permission from some old goat in 
the United States Congress to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait."53 
43 H.RJ. Res. 1145, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964). 
44 Act of Mar. 16, 1967 Pub. L. No. 90-5, § 401, 81 Stat. 5, 6. 
45 See, e.g., Defense Appropriation Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-171, § 638, 83 Stat. 486 
(1969); H.RJ. Res. 447, Pub. L. No. 89-18, 79 Stat. 109 (1965). 
46 See ELY, supra note 8, at 12-46; LoUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ANI> THE CONSTITU-
TION 101-02 (1972). 
47 Ronald Reagan, Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro 
Tempore of the Senate on the Deployment of United States Forces in Grenada (Oct. 25, 
1983), 1983 PUB. PAPERS: RONALD RFAGAN 1512, 1513. 
48 See FISHER, supra note 9, at 141-42. 
49 See Ronald Reagan, Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
President Pro Tempore of the Senate on the United States Air Strike Against Libya (Apr. 
16, 1986), 1986 PuB. PAPERS: RoNALD REAGAN 478, 478. 
50 See Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama under International Law: A Gross Vwlation, 
29 COI:.UM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 293, 293-94, 298 (1991). 
51 See Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Testimony at Hearing of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Federal News Service, Dec. 3, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
Script File. 
52 See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 
102-1, 105 Stat. 3, 3-4 (1991). 
53 Remarks of President George Bush Before the Texas State Republican Convention, 
Federal News Service, June 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File. For 
further statements that congressional suppon was not necessary to launch a military attack 
against Iraq, see George Bush, Remarks at Dedication Ceremony of the Social Sciences 
Complex at Princeton University in Princeton, New Jersey, 27 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 
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The election of a Democratic President in 1992 did not cause the 
trend to abate. At the end of his administration, President Bush sent 
United States troops to Somalia as part of a United Nations relief ef-
fort. Injune 1993, when twenty-three Pakistani soldiers were killed in 
Somalia, President Clinton, without seeking congressional authoriza-
tion, altered the nature of the relief effort by ordering United States 
military action against Mohamed Farah Aideed, the Somali political 
leader whom the United Nations believed was responsible for the kill-
ing. 54 The President simply announced that, in response to the kill-
ing of the Pakistani soldiers, the United States mission in Somalia had 
become a military one.55 
The following year, President Clinton prepared to send troops 
into Haiti to oust that country's military junta without receiving con-
gressional sanction.56 He stated, "Like my predecessors of both par-
ties, I have not agreed that I was constitutionally mandated" to secure 
congressional approval before military intervention.57 United States 
troops were on the verge of invasion when former President Jimmy 
Carter negotiated an agreement under which Haitian leaders re-
signed.58 In some regards, however, Bosnia represents an even more 
dramatic assertion of executive authority over the military. Troops 
were deployed into a war zone pursuant to the President's Com-
mander-in-Chief power,59 not only without congressional approval, 
589, 590 (May 10, 1991); George Bush, Statement on Signing the Resolution Authorizing 
the Use of Military Force Against Iraq, 27 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 48 (Jan. 14, 1991). 
54 See FISHER, supra note 9, at 153-54. 
55 See id. at 153. Under pressure from Congress, President Clinton agreed to with-
draw all troops from Somalia by March 31, 1994, and he carried out that agreement. See id. 
at 154. 
56 For discussion of the preparation of an invasion of Haiti and subsequent events, see 
id. at 154-57. 
57 Presidential News Conference: Health Care, Haiti and Crime Transcript of President Clin-
ton :S News Conference at the White House, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1994, at A16. Assistant Attorney 
General Walter Dellinger justified the sending of troops to Haiti in a more limited way, 
argning, among other things, that the deployment of troops would not be "war" in the 
constitutional sense because "a 'war' does not exist where United States troops are 
deployed at the invitation of a fully legitimate government in circumstances in which the 
nature, scope, and duration of the deployment are such that the use of force involved does 
not rise to the level of 'war.'" Walter Dellinger, After the Cold War: Presidential P(JU)er and the 
Use of Military Force, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 107, 115 (1995). See also Word for Word: A Presi-
dent:S Ability to Declare War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1994, atA29 (Office of Legal Counsel letter 
offering legal basis for troop deployment in Haiti). Neither house explicitly opposed the 
invasion. After the Security Council passed a resolution on July 31, 1994 urging there-
moval of the Haitian government, however, the United States Senate unanimously voted 
that that resolution "does not constitute authorization for the deployment of United States 
Armed Forces in Haiti under the Constitution of the United States or pursuant to the War 
Powers Resolution." 140 CoNe. RE.c. S10,415, 10,433, 10,510 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1994). 
58 Elaine Sciolino, On the Brink of War, a Tense Battle of Wills, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1994, 
at AI. 
59 See Donald L. Robinson, Who Has the Power to Put U.S. Troops in Hann:S Way?, CHRIS. 
TIAN Sc1. MoNITOR, Dec. 19, 1995 (discussing President Clinton's "insist[ence] that he did 
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but over the clearly and repeatedly expressed objectioris.ofthe House 
of Representatives. 6o 
Congress's principal check on the military power of the Executive 
has been the War Powers Resolution,61 which was passed in 1973 over 
President Nixon's veto.62 The resolution provides that the President 
must notify Congress within forty-eight hours of the start of combat 
involving American troops and that, unless Congress authorizes hostil-
ities, he or she must withdraw those troops within sixty days (a time 
period that can be extended to ninety days upon appropriate presi-
dential certification). 63 The measure explicitly presents itself as re-
flecting the constitutional dictates according to the original 
understanding, not as altering either the constitutional powers of 
Congress or of the President. It states that "[i] t is the purpose of this 
chapter to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the 
United States."64 
Presidents have seen the matter differently. In his veto message, 
President Nixon denounced the resolution as an unconstitutional in-
fringement on his powers as Commander in Chief and as violative of 
not need congressional approval to enforce the Dayton Agreement"); Congressional Ap-
provalNotNeededforBosniaForce, WhiteHouse Says, CHI. Trun., Oct. 9,1995, § 1 at3 (quoting 
White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta as stating that "[President Clinton] believes that, 
like all other presidents, he is not about to give up on his prerogatives as commander in 
chief."). 
60 On October 30, 1995, the House passed a sense of the House resolution stating 
that "no United States Armed [F]orces should be deployed ... until the Congress has 
approved such a deployment." H.R Res. 247(2), 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CoNG. REc. 
Hll398 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1995). On November 17, the House passed a bill providing 
that, in the absence of future specific appropriations, the United States was not to use 
government funds to support United States troops in Bosnia. See H.R. Res. 2606, 104th 
Cong., 1stSess., 141 CoNG.REc.H13,233 (dailyed.Nov.17, 1995) (enacted). After troops 
were deployed, the Senate passed a resolution that expressed "reservations ... about Presi-
dent Clinton's decision to deploy United States Armed Forces," but, sin1=e the mission had 
begun, sanctioned it provided that the United States would lead an effort to arm Bosnian 
Muslims and that United States troops would leave Bosnia within "approximately one 
year." SJ. Res. 44, 104th Cong., 1stSess., 141 CoNe. REc. S18552 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1995). 
The resolution was not intended as support for the underlying policy; Senator Bob Dole, 
its co-sponsor, declared, "[W]e oppose the decision to deploy troops." Id. at S18550. The 
House was even more critical of the President's actions. It passed a resolution deploring 
the fact that "[d]espite the expressed will of the House of Representatives ... , the Presi-
dent has chosen to proceed with the deployment of approximately 20,000 members of the 
United States Armed Forces" and formally declared "opposition to the President's policy." 
H.R Res. 302, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CoNG. REc. H14849 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1995). 
For an excellent and detailed account of presidential activity in the years since the 
Second World War, see FISHER, supra note 9, at 70-161. 
61 50 u.s.c. §§ 1541-48 (1994). 
62 See Text of President Nixon's Message Vetoing the War Powers Resolution [herein-
after Nixon Veto], reprinted in REVELEY, supra note 14, at 293-97. 
63 See 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1994). 
64 Id. § 1541(a). The statute asserts that the Constitution permits the President to 
commit troops to combat on his own authority only where an attack upon American terri-
tory or against American troops creates "a national emergency." Id. § 1541(c). 
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the original understanding.65 Nixon's response has sexved as the 
model for subsequent presidential action. AB Professor Michael Paul-
sen has written, "No President has accepted the 1973 War Powers Res-
olution as binding, on the ground that it unconstitutionally interferes 
with the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief."66 Since 1973, 
Presidents committing United States troops to combat have repeat-
edly failed to notify Congress or have filed a report which was inten-
tionally not identified as a hostilities report (and which therefore, 
according to executive branch officials, did not start the War Powers 
Resolution's sixty day clock) .67 In the face of Executive actions reflect-
ing the view that the Resolution is unconstitutional, Congress has 
failed to muster anything remotely resembling an effective response. 
It has neither denied funding to any of these military efforts nor legis-
latively proclaimed that, despite the fact that the President has not 
filed a required hostilities report, the sixty day clock was triggered.68 
B. Competing Interpretations of the War Powers Clause 
Given the ongoing real-world controversy about the meaning of 
the War Powers Clause and the enormous stakes involved in such con-
troversy, it is hardly surprising that, since the start of the Vietnam War, 
the academic debate about the meaning of the War Powers Clause has 
been one of the most prominent in constitutional law. Two sharply 
divergent readings of the Clause have emerged, and scholars have jus-
tified each reading as consistent with the original understanding. 
Defenders of a broad Executive power to initiate combat have 
claimed that the Framers intended that the War Powers Clause be 
65 See Nixon Veto, supra note 62, at 293, 295. 
66 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the 
Lau!ls, 83 GEO. LJ. 217, 267 (1994). 
67 See john 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War 
Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 
293, 315-22 (1993) (discussing executive branch nullification of resolution). See also ELY, 
supra note 8, at 49 (listing the war in Indochina, the Iranian rescue effort of 1980, the 
sending of troops to Lebanon in 1982-1983, the invasion of Grenada in 1983, the Gulf of 
Sidra incident and Tripoli bombing of 1986, the 1987-1988 Persian Gulf War against Iran, 
and the invasion of Panama in 1989 as instances in which Presidents should have, but did 
not, file hostilities reports). For examples of presidential reports, see Text of President 
Ford's Mayaguez Report of May 15, 1975, reprinted in REVELEY, supra note 14, at 301-03; 
Text of President Carter's Iran Report of April 26, 1980, reprinted in REvELEY, supra note 14, 
at 303-06; Report of President George Bush (Dec. 21, 1989), in THOMAS M. FRANCK & 
MICHAEL j. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAw 596-97 (2d ed. 
1993). 
68 See Yoo, supra note 22, at 182. Whether the War Powers Resolution could be re-
vised in such a way as to be made effective is a matter for debate. Compare ELY, supra note 8, 
at 63-66 (suggesting how the Resolution could be amended to make it effective) with Bob-
bitt, supra note 15, at 1371, 1397-1400 (rejecting the War Powers Resolution as an "absurd 
failure"). 
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read narrowly.69 Under this view, when the Framers gave Congress 
the power to "declare war," they intentionally used a term with a pre-
cise meaning in international law, a meaning familiar to them from 
their reading of Blackstone70 and such civil law scholars as Grotius71 
and Vattel.72 Dean Rostow, a leading proponent of this view, has 
written: 
Under international law, force may be used between states both in 
time of war and in time of peace. ; . . A "declaration of war" trans-
forms the relationship between the belligerents into a state of 
war .... The state of war contemplates unlimited hostilities between 
_ 69 See, e.g., Bobbitt, supra note 15, at 1375-76; Emerson, War Powers Resolution, supra 
note 23, at 211-13; Rostow, Once More, supra note 19, at 5-7; Yoo, supra note 22, at 193-94. 
70 For Blackstone, conflict could begin without a declaration of war. In particular, 
issuance of letters of marque and reprisal created an "incomplete state of hostilities." 1 
WILUAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *250. The declaration of war SeiVed a limited, 
although importan~ role: "[I]n order to make a war completely effectual, it is necessary 
with us in England that it be publicly declared and duly proclaimed by the king's authority; 
and, then, all parts of both the contending nations, from the highest to the lowest, are 
bound by it." Id. Blackstone thus treated the declaration of war as the culminating step 
with respect to conflict between nations. 
71 Grotius obseiVed that "most wars are begun without declaration ofruar." HuGo GRO-
TJUS, ON THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 318 (WiJJiam Whewell trans., abr. ed. 1853) (citing 
Dio Chrysostom). The declaration was necessary for certain "peculiar effects," id. at 319, 
such as to authorize seizure of the property of foreign nationals. See id. at 318. 
72 Like Grotius, Vattel concluded that not all wars had to be declared, though his 
treatment differed from Grotius's, see supra note 71, since Vattel took the position that in 
some situations declarations of war were necessary to begin hostilities legitimately. Vattel 
wrote, "He who is attacked and only wages defensive war, needs not to make any hostile 
declaration .... " EMMERICH DE V~TTEL, THE LAw OF NATIONS 316 Uoseph Chitty ed., 
1861). Thus, a declaration of war was not necessary to respond to attack. Pro-Executive 
scholar J. Terry Emerson has suggested that Vattel distinguished between "wars of aggres-
sion and conquest," which required declarations of war, and defensive wars, which did not 
require such declarations. See Emerson, War Powers Resolution, supra note 23, at 212. This, 
however, was not the distinction that Vattel himself drew. For Vattel, nondefensive wars-
the wars which required a declaration of war-were those in which the nation had not 
been attacked, but in which 'justice nonetheless dictated going to war. "The right of mak-
ing war," Vattel began his chapter on declarations of war, 
belongs to nations only as a remedy against injustice: it is the offspring of 
unhappy necessity. This remedy is so dreadful in its effects, so destructive 
to mankind, so grievous even to the party who-has recourse to it, that un-
questionably the law of nature allows ofit only in the last extremity,-that is 
to say, when every other expedient proves ineffectual for the maintenance 
of justice. 
VATTEI., supra, at 314. Although Emerson suggests that Vattel thought that declarations of 
war were the means by which wars of "aggression and conquest" were sanctioned, see Emer-
son, War Powers Resolution, supra note 23, at 212 & n.131, Vattel believed that unjust wars 
violated natural law, writing that "in order to be justifiable in taking up arms, it is necessary 
..• [t]hat we have a just cause of complaint." Id. 
Vattel agreed with Grotius that declarations of war had important juridical conse-
quences: "Without such a public declaration of war, it would, in a treaty of peace, be too 
difficult to determine those acts which are to be considered as the effects of war, and those 
that each nation may set down as injuries of which she means to demand reparation." Id. 
at 316. 
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the belligerents, the internment or expulsion of enemy aliens, the 
termination of diplomatic relations, the sequestration or even con-
fiscation of enemy property, and the imposition of regulations-
censorship, for example-which would be unthinkable in liberal-
minded states during peacetime. 73 · 
In other words, the power to declare war is a quasi-judicial power: 
Congress determines whether to make a legal declaration that a state 
of war exists. Such a determination is significant, since a declaration 
has important consequences for the rights of both citizens and aliens. 
But the declaration typically follows the onset of hostilities, rather 
than preceding them, and the declaration is not necessary to legalize 
the hostilities themselves. 74 
Similarly, when the Founders gave Congress the power to "grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal,"75 they were also using "language ... 
peculiar to international law,"76 and, again, that language had a pre-
cise, and limited, meaning. Sovereigns granted letters of marque and 
reprisal to individuals allowing them to pursue specific claims against 
citizens of other countries. 77 These people were thereby authorized 
to take the property-and sometimes, even seize the persons-of 
their debtors and those who had wronged them. In wartime, the let-
ters empowered civilians to capture the property of the enemy and 
her citizens.78 But the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal 
was not the power to start war.79 For proponents of this view, then, 
the power to initiate conflict is not to be found solely-or even pri-
marily-in the War Powers Clause. Rather, it is to be found in the 
Constitution's desiguation of the President as Commander in Chie£8° 
and, in addition, in its grant to him or her of all executive power.81 
Proponents of the pro-Congress reading of the War Powers 
Clause offer a diametrically opposed reading of the original under-
standing. They reject the idea that the phrases in the Clause were 
intended to be read in the established, technical sense. According to 
73 Rostow, Once More, supra note 19, at 6. 
74 For more extensive development of this argument, see Bobbitt, supra note 15, at 
1396-1400; Emerson, War Powers Resolution, supra note 23, at 211-12; Rostow, Once More, 
supra note 19, at 3-18; Yoo, supra note 22, at 204-08. 
75 U.S. CaNST. art I,§ 8, cl. 11. 
76 Rostow, Once More, supra note 19, at 6. 
77 See Yoo, supra note 22, at 250.51. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. at 206. 
80 See U.S. CaNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
81 See id. art. 2, § 1, cl. 1. Pro-Executive scholars do maintain, however, that the Fram-
ers did not intend for Congress to be powerless to check the President, since they gave it 
the power "to raise and support armies," id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, and the power of the purse, 
id. an. I, § 8, cl. 1-2, 5. See Bobbitt, supra note 15, at 1388-1400; Emerson, War Powers 
Resolution, supra note 23, at 201-03; Rostow, Once More, supra note 19, at 14-15; Yoo, supra 
note 22, at 209-10. 
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Professor Charles Lofgren, for example, the word "declare" as used in 
the Constitution "had a broader meaning than it did in the treatises 
and international practice. It meant 'commence.' "82 Similarly, the 
phrase "Letters of Marque and Reprisal" "conferred on Congress 
power over general reprisals outside the context of declared war."83 
Most important, the two phrases were meant to be read together.84 
They are the only two specific grants of war-initiating power in the 
Constitution.85 Thus, regardless of how they are parsed individually, 
together they mean that the Founders intended Congress to have the 
power to initiate all conflict-except when necessary to repel sudden 
attacks. In this regard, it should be stressed that pro-Congress original-
ists do not maintain that all wars had to be formally declared, merely 
that they be approved in advance in some fashion. As Dean Ely writes, 
"[A]ll wars, big or small, 'declared' in so many words or not ... had to 
be legislatively authorized."86 
Under this view, the Founders were not ignorant of the fact that 
the phrases they used had specific meanings at international law. 
They knew, moreover, that by the eighteenth century most wars were 
not declared-as Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 25, "[T]he cere-
mony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse 
.... "
87
-and letters of marque and reprisal were rarely issued.88 But, 
as Professor Lofgren observed, "[D]eviation from international usage 
[with respect to these terms] would have seemed proper ... since the 
Constitution involved domestic arrangements."89 According to Pro-
fessor Bestor, "[T]he phrase 'declare war' [in the Constitution] was 
universally understood as synonymous with what the Articles of Con-
federation had described as [Congress's] 'sole and exclusive right and 
power of determining on ... war.' "90 
Pro-Executive scholars have a counter to such claims (apart from 
offering their competing vision of the original understanding). These 
writers contend that, even if the pro-Congress camp is correct about 
the original understanding of the War Powers Clause, that under-
standing should not bar Presidents from initiating conflict. The argu-
82 Lofgren, Understanding, supra note 12, at 695. 
83 Id. at 696. 
84 See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 9, at 2-3. 
85 Proponents of the pro-Congress reading argue that the Commander-in-Chief 
Clause was intended to give the President control over the military only after war has com-
menced. See Fisher, supra note 9, at 9-12. 
86 ELY, supra note 8, at 3 (footnote omitted). 
87 THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 161 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
88 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 8, at 3, 140 n.5; Bestor, supra note 14, at 608-09; Lofgren, 
Understanding, supra note 12, at 694-97. 
89 Lofgren, Understanding, supra note 12, at 695. 
90 Bestor, supra note 14,,at 608 (alteration in original) (quoting ARTS. OF CoNFED. art. 
IX). 
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ment is not that original intent is never relevant, but that it is 
irrelevant here for reasons unique to the War Powers Clause. 
The first "unique" reason advanced is that, regardless of the origi-
nal understanding, the President's ability to initiate and conduct war 
without explicit congressional approval is constitutional because of 
long-standing practice. For example, J. Terry Emerson, after stating 
that there are over two hundred incidents in which Presidents have 
initiated the use of military force abroad, concludes that " 'history has 
legitimated the practice of presidential war-making.' "91 Emerson fol-
lows Henry Monaghan, who notes "the long and ever-accumulating 
practice of presidential 'war-making'" and observes that "[a] practice 
so deeply embedded in our governmental structure should be treated 
as decisive of the constitutional issue."92 
A closely-related second reason is that this practice reflects 
broader constitutional concerns that have become more pressing with 
the passage of time. Thus, Judge Bork argues that the President has 
"primacy in foreign affairs," and that primacy is the joint product of 
constitutional structure and historical evolution: "The respective roles 
of Congress and the president developed according to their structural 
capacities and limitations. Congress, consisting of 535 members as-
sisted by huge staffs, is obviously incapable of swift, decisive, and flexi-
ble action in the employment of armed force .... "93 Because 
91 Emerson, War Powers Legislation, supra note 23, at 72 (quoting with approval 
Monaghan, supra note 18, at 29). Proponents of this view disagree on the precise number 
of such incidents. Writing a few years before Emerson, the Office of the Legal Adviser for 
the Department of State justified President Johnson's activities in Viemam by asserting 
more modestly that there were 125 instances of presidential warmaking. See Office of tbe 
Legal Adviser, supra note 23, at llOl. Critics of this view both contest its history and the 
underlying theory. Dean Ely thus argues that "post-ratification practice in violation of the 
Constitution [cannot] change it," and that "the original constitutional understanding was 
quite consistently honored from the framing until 1950." ELY, supra note 8, at 10. For 
other criticisms of the view that there was a pattern of executive-initiated conflict prior to 
the Korean War, see ScHLESINGER, supra note 13, at 133; WoRMUTH ET AI .• , supra note 14, at 
14049; W. Taylor Reveley III, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or Uswpa-
tion?, 55 VA. L. REv. 1243, 1258 (1969). 
92 Monaghan, supra note 18, at 31. 
93 Bork, Foreword, supra note 16, at x. Explicitly embracing Judge Bork's position, Pro-
fessor W. Michael Reisman has similarly declared that original intent should not control 
the meaning of the War Powers Clause: "The Constitution is part of our constitutive pro-
cess in which we determine how to establish and maintain our fundamental decision-mak-
ing institutions so that they can provide liberty, security, and the fulfillment of other 
constitutional goals in ways optimally consistent with historic values but responsive to con-
temporary exigencies." Reisman, supra note 21, at 212. See also ELY, supra note 8, at 143 
n.24 (stating thatJudge Bork's view ofWar Powers Clause "seems out of accord with [his] 
usual strongly argued 'original intent' approach to constitutional interpretation"). Dean 
Rostow has advanced an argument similar to Judge Bork's. See Rostow, Once More, supra 
note 19, at 48 ("The problem facing the nation is to fashion and refashion the Presidency 
and Congress as responsible and cooperative institutions capable of carrying out a foreigu 
policy adequate to the security needs of our times and of the forseeable future."). 
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situations change so rapidly and dangers to the national well-being 
arise almost instantaneously, necessity dictates that the Executive have 
the power to use force abroad without congressional approvaL As 
Judge Bork has argued, "The need for Presidents to have that power, 
particularly in the modern age, should be obvious to almost 
anyone."94 
In contrast, pro-Congress scholars have not been as quick to ar-
gue that their reading of the War Powers Clause is superior,. even if 
not supported by the original understanding. Ely's treatment here is 
illustrative. The saliency he accords to the original understanding in 
framing his proposal for contemporary jurisprudence is similar to that 
accorded the original understanding by, for example, Professors Glen-
non,95 Koh,96 and Henkin.97 Ely offers three closely-related reasons 
which he suggests animated the Founders and support giving Con-
gress the power to initiate war. First, and most important, the require-
ment of congressional consent ensures that "the concurrence of a 
number of people of various points ofview" has been obtained before 
the nation goes to war.98 (Ely explicitly assumes here that the War 
Powers Clause also requires that the President consent before the na-
tion go to war).99 Second, large bodies move more slowly, ensuring 
careful consideration before war begins.100 Third, "[t]he require-
ment of authorization by both houses of Congress was ... calculated 
to increase the probability that the American people would support 
any war we entered into."101 But the focus of his argument is not that 
these rationales are independently correct. Rather, it is that, because 
the original understanding is clear, it must be followed. He writes: 
One of the recurrent discoveries of academic writing about constitu-
tional law-an all but certain ticket to tenure-is that from the 
standpoint of twentieth-century observers, the "original understand-
ing" of the document's framers and ratifiers can be obscure to the 
point of inscrutability. Often this is true. In this case, however, it 
isn't.102 
Because of its clarity, the original intent is dispositive: "In language 
and recorded purpose the, War Clause made an unmistakable point 
94 Bork, Erosion, supra note 16, at 698. 
95 See MICHAEL]. GLENNON, CoNsnrunoNAL DIPLOMACY 80-84 (1990). 
96 See KoH, supra note 10, at 69-79. 
97 See HENKIN, supra note 46, at 32-35. 
98 ELY, supra note 8, at 4. 
99 See id. 
IOO See id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 3. 
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that needed no further gloss: Acts of war must be authorized by 
Congress."103 
Thus, the question is squarely presented: Who is right about the 
original understanding? And is the underlying rationale that in-
formed the Founders' decisionmaking one that merits serious in-
dependent regard, or is it merely one that merits respect to the extent 
that the original understanding merits respect? 
The next section examines the evidence to which scholars typi-
cally attach the greatest significance-the debates at the Philadelphia 
constitutional convention and the state ratifying conventions. The 
section focuses on what the words "To declare War" meant. There was 
almost no debate in Philadelphia on the Commander~in-Chief Clause 
or the phrase "letters of marque and reprisal."104 Neither generated 
much concern. To the extent that there was discussion, the Com-
mander-in-Chief Clause received more. 105 According to both pro-Ex-
ecutive and pro-Congress writers, 106 the most influential comments 
about the Commander-in-Chief Clause were made by Alexander Ham-
ilton andjames Iredell, both ofwhose statements reflect a view of the 
Commander-in-Chief power as limited to commanding troops once 
war is in progress.107 At the same time, these comments do not repre-
103 Id. at 10. 
104 The principal discussion of the Commander-in-Chief Clause at the Philadelphia 
convention occurred when the convention considered the Comll!ittee on Detail's propo-
sal, under which the President had equal command over the Army and Navy of the United 
States, and of the Militia of the Several States. See 2 Farrand, supra note 27, at 426. Roger 
Sherman moved that the Commander-in-Chief Clause be amended to provide that the 
President would only have control of the state militia "when called into the actual service of 
the [United States)" and his proposal was adopted. Id. (emphasis omitted). This com-
ment about control of state militia is of little relevance to contemporary debates. As for 
the letters of marque and reprisal, the record is even slighter, the only significant comment 
being Elbridge Gerry's assertion, with reference to a list of legislative powers that "some-
thing [ought to be] inserted concerning letters of marque, which he thought not included 
in the power of war." Id. at 326. 
105 See supra note 104 (summarizing relevant discussion on both topics). 
106 Compare Lofgren, Understanding, supra note 12, at 685-86 (focusing on Iredell and 
Hamilton), with Yoo, supra note 22, at 277-78 (same). 
107 Hamilton contrasted the King's powers as Commander in Chief with those of the 
President, which he described as "much inferior" to the King's: 
[The President's power as Commander in Chief] would amount to nothing 
more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval 
forces, as first General and Admiral of the confederacy[;] while that of the 
British King extends to the declaringofwar and to the raising and regulating 
of fleets and armies; all which by the Constitution under consideration 
would appertain to the Legislature. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Simi-
larly, in discussing the President's Commander-in-Chief powers, Iredell stated: 
A very material difference may be observed between this power, and the 
authority of the king of Great Britain under similar circumstances. The 
king of Great Britain is not only the commander-in-chief of the land and 
naval forces, but has power, in time of war, to raise fleets and armies. He 
has also authority to declare war. The President has not the power of de-
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sent a sufficient quantity of evidence to reveal clearly the meaning of 
the Commander-in-Chief Clause or, by inference, the meaning of the 
War Powers Clause. 
C. The Framing of the War Powers Clause 
Although the War Powers Clause has become the source of ex-
tensive controversy, it received very limited discussion at the time of 
the founding. Moreover, as discussed below, the critical passage in 
the debates at the Constitutional Convention is obscure and confus-
ing. Thus, the documents on which scholars traditionally focus in 
their quest to determine the original understanding of constitutional 
text provide only limited insight. 
The initial discussion at the Constitutional Convention concern-
ing the war power occurred in response to the plan of government 
submitted by Edmund Randolph of Virginia. The Virginia plan did 
not address the question of who should be able to commit the nation 
to war; it merely allocated to the "National Legislature ... the Legisla-
tive Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation" and assigned to 
the "National Executive ... the Executive rights vested in Congress by 
the Confederation."108 The question ofwhich powers were executive 
and which were legislative was left open. A number of speakers urged 
that the war power be given to Congress. While South Carolina's 
Charles Pinckney proclaimed himself an advocate of a "vigorous Exec-
utive," he declared that he "was afraid the Executive powers of [the 
existing] Cmigress might extend to peace & war."109 James Wilson 
argued that the "Prerogatives of the British Monarch [were not] a 
proper guide in defining the Executive powers."no "Some of these 
prerogatives," he stated, "were of a Legislative nature. Among others 
that of war & peace &c."m James Madison "agree[d with] Wilson in 
his difinition [sic] of executive powers-executive powers ex vi ter-
mini, do not include the Rights of war & peace &c. but the powers 
[should] be confined and defined-if large we shall have the Evils of 
elective Monarchies."II2 Finally, John Rutledge of South Carolina an-
nounced that "he was not for giving [the Executive] the power of war 
daring war by his own authority, nor that of raising fleets and armies. 
These powers are vested in other hands. The power of declaring war is 
expressly given to Congress .... 
4 THF. DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CoNVF.NTJONS 107-08 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1907) 
[hereinafter Elliot]. 
108 1 Farrand, supra note 27, at 21. 
109 !d. at 64-65 (alteration in original). 
IIO /d. at 65. 
111 ld. at 65-66. See also id. at 73-74 ("Mr. Wilson said the great qualities in the several 
parts of the Executive are vigor and dispatch. Making peace and war are generally deter-
mined by Writers on the Laws of Nations to be legislative powers."). 
II2 !d. at 70. 
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and peace."113 No one argued that the Executive should have the 
power to initiate war.114 
The Convention subsequently created the Committee on Detail 
and assigned to it the task of preparing a constitution that reflected 
the decisions previously made. 115 None of the resolutions forwarded 
to the Committee, however, provided guidance in allocation of the 
war-initiating function.ll 6 At the same time, as indicated above, to 
the extent the matter had been debated, the consensus had been that 
the power to initiate war should be a legislative function. Moreover, 
Wilson and Randolph submitted draft constitutions that gave the legis-
lature the power "to make war." 117 Reflecting these points of view, the 
Committee's final report assigned Congress the sole power "To make 
war; To raise armies; To build and equip fleets;" as well as "To call 
forth the aid of the militia, in order to execute the laws of the Union, 
enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions."118 The 
Convention debated the proposed War Powers Clause on August 17, 
1787. Although the account ofwhat was said-the account recorded 
in Madison's notes-is brief, the debate was apparently the most sus-
tained discussion of the proper allocation of the power to declare war. 
Therefore, this short and cryptic interchange tends to be the focus of 
modern academic discussion about the original understanding.119 
Although it is clear that one participant in that debate, South Caro-
lina's Pierce Butler,120 thought that the President should have the 
113 Id. at 65. 
114 The only other participant in the Convention to make relevant statements at this 
point in the debates concerning the scope of the executive power was Roger Sherman. 
Apparently concurring in the prevailing sentiment that the Executive should not have 
power over war and peace, Sherman responded to Pinckney's expressions of concern by 
stating that he saw the Executive "as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will 
of the Legislature into effect." Id. 
115 See 2 Farrand, supra note 27, at 85. 
116 William Paterson also formally submitted a plan to the Committee but, similar to 
Randolph's plan, it did not allocate the power to initiate war. See 1 Farrand, supra note 27, 
at 242-45 (Paterson's plan). Alexander Hamilton offered a third plan of governance, 
although, unlike Randolph and Paterson, he did not make a formal proposal. In general, 
Hamilton envisioned an extremely powerful Executive. Indeed, a few years later, as the 
author of the Pacificus letters, Hamilton was to take an expansive view of the Executive's 
war powers. See infra Part III.B. But in his speech he did not argue that the Executive 
should have the power to start wars. Rather, while the Executive was "to have the direction 
of war when authorized or begun," Hamilton urged, without offering an explanatory justi-
fication, that the Senate "have the sole power of declaring war." 1 Farrand, supra note 27, 
at 292. 
117 See 2 Farrand, supra note 27, at 143 (Randolph's draft plan); id. at 168 (Wilson's 
draft plan). 
118 Id. at 182. 
119 See id. at 314-19. 
120 Butler argued that the power "to make war" should be given to the President "who 
will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation will support 
it." Id. at 318. 
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power to make war, the intent of virtually every other participant is 
subject to dispute. 
According to Madison's notes, following Butler's comment, he 
and Elbridge Gerry "moved to insert 'declare,' striking out .'make' war; 
leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks."12I This 
motion is the critical moment in the debates and has inspired dramat-
ically different readings. Ely, for example, contends that it makes 
clear that the President has the power under the Commander-in-Chief 
Clause to assume "tactical control" of military operation that had al-
ready received congressional authorization, and that it "reserved to 
the president the power, without advance congressional authoriza-
tion, to 'repel sudden attacks.' "122 Thus, the change did not take 
from Congress the sole power to start wars, except in case of emer-
gency created by "sudden attacks." In contrast, pro-Executive scholars 
see this amendment as departing from the original proposal and 
granting the President the power to start wars; they minimize the sig-
nificance of the phrase "leaving to the Executive the power to repel 
sudden attacks." Thus, Professor Yoo contends that "to repel sudden 
attacks" was seen as establishing the floor of executive power under 
the amended clause, not its ceiling: "Adopting the amendment made 
clear that the President could not unilaterally take the nation into a 
total war, but that he might be able to engage the nation in hostilities 
short of that."123 
Following the motion of Gerry and Madison, Connecticut's Roger 
Sherman stated that the original language "stood very well. The exec-
utive [should] be able to repel and not to commence war. 'Make' 
better than 'declare' the latter narrowing the power too much."124 
Thereby, on a pro-Executive reading, Sherman asserted his view "that 
the President already had the power to respond to attacks, and that 
reducing Congress' power to that of declaring war would permit the 
Executive to commence wars unilaterally."125 A pro-Congress reading 
is simply that Sherman feared that the new language would, by nar-
rowing Congress's power, in some unspecified way, increase the power 
of the Executive.126 
Gerry then said that he "never expected to hear in a republic a 
motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war."127 The stan-
dard pro-Congress reading is that he is responding to Butler's com-
121 ld. 
122 ELY, supra note 8, at 5. 
Yoo, supra note 22, at 264. 123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
2 Farrand, supra note 27, at 318. 
Yoo, supra note 22, at 262. 
See Lofgren, Understanding, supra note 12, at 676. 
2 Farrand, supra note 27, at 318. 
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ment that the President should be able to make war. 128 Thus, Gerry is 
using "declare" as synonymous with "make."129 The problem with this 
view is that it breaks the sequence-Sherman, not Butler, was the 
speaker before Gerry-and Butler was not addressing the motion that 
was on the floor at the time of Gerry's speech. Thus, it would seem 
odd for Gerry to be responding to Butler. On the other hand, Profes-
sor Yoo argues that Gerry thought that Sherman was seeking to give 
the President the power to declare war (in the sense of declaring war 
under international law), and was asserting that he was appalled that 
anyone would suggest that the President should have such a power.130 
But, as Yoo acknowledges, 131 this reading is based on Gerry's com-
plete misunderstanding of Sherman. Although Sherman's statement 
can be read in different ways, there is nothing in Madison's notes that 
would indicate that Sherman wanted to expand presidential power.13 2 
Neither the pro-Congress nor the pro-Executive reading is neces-
sarily wrong. Mter all, people misunderstand each other all the time 
and they frequently address the comments of someone other than the 
previous speaker. But each reading is problematic. And so the record 
provided by Madison-both with respect to Gerry's comment and, 
more generally, with respect to the debate as a whole-does not tell us 
with any certainty what the Convention understood itself to be doing 
when it voted eight to two (with one abstention) to substitute "de-
clare" for "make."133 Professor Jack Rakove has recently suggested an 
explanation for the unsatisfying record of this debate. 134 He notes 
that the War Powers Clause was discussed toward the end of the pro-
128 
129 
130 
131 
See ELY, supra note 8, at 3. 
See Bestor, supra note 14, at 603-04. 
See Yoo, supra note 22, at 262-63. 
See id. at 262. 
132 Philip Bobbitt offers another pro-Executive reading of the text: Gerry is respond-
ing to Shennan's appeal for "make," rather than "declare," by suggesting that use of the 
word "make" would have the consequence of giving the President the power to declare war 
(again, using the tenn as it is used in international law). Bobbitt, supra note 15, at 1380-81. 
But this reading necessarily requires that Gerry engaged in hyperbole and indirection. 
Shennan had very clearly not made "a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare 
war." 2 Farrand, supra note 27, at 318. 
133 Even the actual vote is unclear, and that is significant as well. Madison indicates 
that the original vote was seven in favor, two against, one abstention, and that Ellsworth 
changed his vote (and hence Connecticut's vote) when Rufus King said "that 'make' war 
might be understood to 'conduct' it which was an Executive function." 2 Farrand, supra 
note 27, at 319 n.*. This suggests that, once Ellsworth understood that the change was 
needed to make clear that Congress would not have tactical command of the military after 
it had authorized combat, he shifted his vote. The official record indicates, in contrast, 
that the change was originally defeated 5 to 4, but that on re-vote, it passed eight to one. 
See id. at 314. This would suggest that King's comment was not simply important to Ells-
worth, but to the critical swing voters. See Lofgren, Understanding, supra note 12, at 676-77; 
Yoo, supra note 22, at 264 & n.475. 
134 See JACK N. RAKovE, ORIGINAL MEANINGs: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 83-84 (1996). 
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ceedings in Philadelphia.135 Weary delegates were no longer carefully 
articulating their positions, and Madison was no longer carefully re-
cording them. 136 
In addition to arguing that the debates in Philadelphia support 
their view, pro-Congress scholars also highlight statements made dur-
ing the ratification debates in the states, which they believe demon-
strate that the power to declare ·war was the power to initiate 
conflict.137 The most powerful statement from this perspective is one 
made by James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention: 
This [new] system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard 
against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single 
body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power 
of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large: this declaration 
must be made with the concurrence of the House of Representa-
tives: from this circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that 
nothing but our national interest can draw us into a war.138 
As Lofgren writes, in this statement Wilson "not only implicitly 
equated declaring war and entering war, but also explicitly foreclosed 
exercise of the power by the President acting alone."139 Others at the 
state conventions equated Congress's power over war under the Con-
stitution with its power under the Articles of Confederation, and thus 
implicitly indicated that Congress was retaining the power to initiate 
conflict. As Robert Livingston declared at the New York convention: 
"But, say the gentlemen, our present [Articles of Confederation] Con-
gress have not the same powers [as Congress would have under the 
Constitution]. I answer, They have the very same ... [including] the 
power of making war .... "140 
135 See id. 
136 See id. 
137 It should be added that, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, these state-
ments are more significant than the statements made during the constitutional conven-
tion, although the scholarly controversy about the war power tends to focus on the 
Philadelphia debates. To the extent that the founding generation thought original under-
standing relevant to constitutional interpretation, it was the understanding of the ratifiers, 
who made the Constitution law, not the understanding of the participants at Philadelphia, 
whose deliberations were secret. The classic statement on point is Madison's: "As the in-
strument came from [the Philadelphia convention], it was nothing more than a draught of 
a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it, by the voice 
of the people, speaking through the several state conventions." James Madison, Jay's 
Treaty: Speech in the House of Representatives (Apr. 6, 1796), in 16 MADISON PAPERS, 
supra note 35, at 296. See also RAKOVE, supra note 134, at 339-65; Charles A. Lofgren, The 
Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CoNsr. CoMMENTARY 77 (1988); H. Jefferson 
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885 (1985); Treanor, 
judicial Review, supra note 5, at 544-52. 
138 2 Elliot, supra note 107, at 528. 
139 Lofgren, Understanding, supra note 12, at 685. 
140 2 Elliot, supra note 107, at 278. See also 3 id. at 259 (Madison). 
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In contrast, there are apparently no statements in which the term 
"declare War" as used in the Constitution is clearly defined by refer-
ence to international law.141 But this absence is far from dispositive. 
A number of pro-Congress scholars-although not alll42-have ac-
knowledged that their evidence, while probative, is not sufficient to 
decide the question. As Lofgren candidly observes of his reading of 
the clause, "[O]ne cannot pretend that the matter is beyond all 
doubt." 143 Similarly, W. Taylor Reveley III, the author of War Powers of 
the President and Congress, perhaps the most thorough treatment of the 
war power, concludes that the records of the Constitutional Conven-
tion are "inconclusive" and that they "are not sharp~ned by available 
accounts of the ratification debates."144 
A number of Antifederalists took the position that the Constitution vested in Congress 
the power to initiate war and criticized the Constitution for this reason. For example, at 
the Virginia debates Patrick Henry bemoaned the fact that "Congress can both declare war 
and carry it on, and levy your money, as long as you have a shilling to pay." !d. at 172. In 
making his argument, Henry highlighted the distinction between the United States Consti-
tution and English practice since, under the latter, "[t]he King declares war; the House of 
Commons gives the means of carrying it on." !d. at 172. For other examples of Antifeder-
alist objections to the fact that Congress possessed both the powers of purse and sword, see 
2 id. at 374-77 Uohn Lansing, Jr. & Melancton Smith); Richard Henry Lee, Letters of a 
Federal Farmer, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CoNsriTUTION OF THE UNITED STATF.S 279, 291 (Paul 
Leicester Ford ed., 1888). These criticisms drew on one of the traditional and fundamen-
tal principles of mixed government, which was, as George Mason stated it during the 
course of the Constitutional Convention, that "[t]he purse & the sword might never get 
into the same hands <Whether legislative or executive>." 1 Farrand, supra note 27, at 139-
40. In response, some Federalists took the position that this reading of the Constitution 
was correct, but the concern unfounded. Thus, Oliver Ellsworth asked: 
[D]oes it follow, because it is dangerous to give the power of the sword and 
purse to an hereditary prince, who is independent of the people, that there-
fore it is dangerous to give it to the Parliament-to Congress, which is your 
Parliament-to men appointed by yourselves, and dependent upon your-
selves? This argument amounts to this: you must cut a man in two in the 
middle, to prevent his hurting himself. 
2 Elliot, supra note 107, at 195. Such statements reflect the view that the decision to declare 
war is not simply a decision as to whether hostilities should be classified as a war for pur-
poses of international law. Rather, it is the power of the sword. Similarly, John Marshall 
asked: "Are the people of England more secure, if the Commons have no voice in declar-
ing war? or are we less secure by having the Senate joined with the President?" 3 id. at 233. 
Marshall's statement, however, apparently reflects a confusion of the war-making power 
and the treaty-making power. 
141 See Bestor, supra note 14, at 608 & n.279. Thus, even Professor Yoo, author of the 
most careful and complete pro-Executive history, does not offer any examples of this type. 
See generally Yoo, supra note 22. 
142 Dean Ely, for example, treats the evidence as unambiguous. See ELY, supra note 8, 
at 5 (noting "clarity" of original understanding). He has received significant criticism on 
this point. See Peter D. Coffman, Power and Duty: The Language of the War Power, 80 COR· 
NELL L. REv. 1236, 1241 n.30 (1995} (reviewing ELY, supra note 8, and finding his discus-
sion of original understanding "peremptory"); Peter J. Spiro, War Powers and the Siren of 
Fonnalism. 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1338, 1357 (1993) (reviewing ELY, supra note 8, and attacking 
his treatment of original understanding). 
143 Lofgren, Understanding, supra note 12, at 697. 
144 REVELEY, supra note 14, at 84. 
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Not surprisingly, pro-Executive scholars find this evidence uncon-
vincing, in part because only a few speakers equate the power to de-
clare war and the power to initiate conflict, but also because many of 
the statements quoted above are unreliabie indicia of what the Consti-
tution meant. Thus, Yoo suggests that Livingston's statement equat-
ing the new and old Congress's power reflected a "misunderstanding 
[that] may have occurred due to a failure to read the new Constitu-
tion carefully .... "145 Wilson's statement, in contrast, is clear, and he 
was obviously familiar with the Constitution's text as a result of his 
service as a delegate at the Philadelphia Convention. It is nonetheless 
possible to argue that his statements only reflect his view, and that he 
is a "dissenter from the prevailing Federalist view on war powers."146 
Therefore, Professor Yoo, a sophisticated pro-Executive scholar, ar-
gues not that all the Founders thought that the President could initi-
ate war, but that this was the dominant view.147 Of course, if all that 
the pro-Executive camp could do was criticize and minimize the evi-
dence offered by the pro-Congress camp, the case for a pro-Executive 
reading of the Clause would not be very substantial-particularly in 
view of the absence of statements directly supporting that reading. 
But pro-Executive scholars have advanced a strong independent argu-
ment: the Founders operated against a background in which there was 
a "shared understanding"148 that the Executive had the power to start 
war, and pro-Congress scholars have failed to offer convincing evi-
dence that the Founders departed from that understanding. This ar-
gument and the inability of pro-Congress scholars to respond to it or 
to another type of evidence that challenges their thesis-evidence 
that the President did not have a veto over declarations of war-are 
discussed in the next section. 
D. The Case against the Pro-Congress Reading of the War 
Powers Clause 
Pro-Executive scholars have advanced a number of contextual ar-
guments favoring their reading of the War Powers Clause. Knit to-
gether, these arguments powerfully suggest that, in the absence of 
some countervailing consideration not previously uncovered by schol-
ars, the Founders would not have given Congress alone the power tq 
initiate war. 
The first point, and the point that has been treated as central by 
pro-Executive scholars, has already been discussed. 149 The terms used 
145 Yoo, supra note 22, at 282 n.532. 
146 Id. at 287 n.547. 
147 See id. 
148 Id. at 173. 
149 See supra Part I.B. 
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in the War Powers Clause-declarations of war and letters of marque 
and reprisal-were terms that had a particular meaning under inter-
national law. The power to declare war was a quasi-judicial function, 
and letters of marque and reprisal had a limited role. The Founders 
knew these meanings and presumably relied on them when they used 
these terms. As Dean Rostow explains, "The language . . . can only be 
understood in the setting of internationallaw."15° "[W]hy," J. Terry 
Emerson asks, "if the framers meant to make the Executive no more 
than the 'agent' of the Legislature in matters of military affairs, did 
they not say so in clear words ... ?"151 
Second, English precedent accorded the Executive the power to 
initiate war. Professor Yoo writes: 
The eighteenth-century English monarch was commander-in-chief 
of the armed forces and possessed exclusive power to enter into 
treaties, to declare war, and to raise and regulate the army and 
navy .... Naturally, then, when the Framers allocated war powers 
between the President and Congress, they used as their baseline the 
separation of powers they believed to exist between King and 
Parliament.152 
Third, the writers to whom the Founders looked on separation of 
powers matters-:John Locke, William Blackstone, and Montes-
quieu-all believed that the Executive should have responsibility for 
starting and carrying on war.153 
Fourth, the mcyority of state constitutions that preceded the Fed-
eral Constitution "either assumed that the governors had broad war-
making authority, or explicitly gave them such power in terms remi-
niscent of the British constitution and the colonial charters."154 
Fifth, as former Secretary of State William Rogers has argued, the 
Founders believed that the Executive was distinguished by its capacity 
to act swiftly, vigorously, and secretly, attributes that they recognized 
were of peculiar value in the realm of foreign affairs.155 
Sixth, the Federal Constitution vested in the Executive powers 
that the first state constitutions, departing from English and colonial 
precedent, had given to the legislature.156 "[A]n impartial review of 
the history of this early period," Terry Emerson observes, "reveals that 
the attitudes of the majority of persons who wrote the state constitu-
150 Rostow, Once More, supra note 19, at 6. 
151 Emerson, War Powers Resolution, supra note 23, at 209. 
152 Yoo, supra note 22, at 217. Colonial governors also had broad military powers, 
although, as subordinate crown officials, typically lacked the power to declare war. See id. 
at 219-20. 
153 See id. at 199-204. 
154 Id. at 226. 
155 See Rogers, supra note 23, at 1196 & n.10. 
156 See Emerson, War Powers Resolution, supra note 23, at 208. 
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tions had undergone a change from an initial dread of the royalty in 
the 1770's to a perception of the need for a strong executive by the 
1780's."157 
Taken together, these factors suggest that it would be profoundly 
surprising for the Founders to have granted Congress the power to 
initiate conflict. For them to believe that such a decision was appro-
priate, there would have had to have been some concern causing 
them to tum against the great tide of constitutional history. In gen-
eral, the first state constitutions took from the Executive his tradi-
tional powers; the Constitution gave them back.158 To allocate the 
war power to Congress alone would have been directly countercycli-
cal-taking from the Executive a power that was so much a core Exec-
utive function that even anti-Executive state constitutions had 
allocated it to him. 
Moreover, each of the points made by pro-Executive scholars is 
historically accurate. The power to start war was historically an Execu-
tive function, and this was an allocation supported by the thinkers 
who influenced the Founders. Blackstone was unambiguous in 
describing British practice. "[T]he King," he wrote, "has also the sole 
prerogative of making war and peace."159 "(W]ar is not undertaken 
by private persons, but by the will of the whole community; whose 
right of willing is in this case transferred to the supreme magistrate by 
the fundamental laws of society."160 Locke believed that this was the 
proper assignment of the power,161 and Montesquieu similarly as-
signed to the Executive the power to start and conduct war.162 The 
157 Jd. 
158 See id. at 207. 
159 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *249. 
160 Id. at *250. 
161 In Chapter XII of his Second Treatise of Government, Locke divided governmental 
power in a commonwealth into three parts: legislative, executive, and federative. See joHN 
LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GoVERNMENT bk.II, §§ 143-48 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 1960) (1690). The federative power encompassed relations between the com-
monwealth and all persons and entities outside of it. See id. at bk.II, §145. "[T]he power of 
War and Peace" was part of the federative power. See id. at bk.II, § 146. Locke contended 
that the federative power should be exercised by the executive: 
Though, as I said, the Executive and Federative Power of every Community be 
really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated, and placed, 
at the same time, in the hands of distinct Persons. For both of them requir-
ing the force of the society for their exercise, it is almost impracticable to 
place the Force of the Commonwealth in distinct, and not subordinate 
hands; or that the Executive and Federative Power should be placed in Persons 
that might act separately, whereby the Force of the Publick would be under 
different Commands: which would be apt sometime or other to cause dis-
order and ruine. 
Id. at bk.II, § 148. 
162 Montesquieu divided governmental power into three parts: "the legislative; the ex-
ecutive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive, in regard 
to things that depend on the civil laws." MoNTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAws bk. XI, ch. 6, 
722 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:695 
Founders also recognized that the President possessed certain attrib-
utes of obvious value in war. As Hamilton explained, "Decision, activ-
ity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterise the proceedings 
of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of 
any greater number .... "163 
It is also true that the first state constitutions, enacted in the ini-
tial flush of independence, had vested in the legislatures powers tradi-
tionally held by the Executive.164 This system of governance gave 
many of the Framers an appreciation of the importance of limiting 
legislative power. Accordingly, as Gordon Wood observed, the Fed-
eral Constitution represented a "repudiation"165 of the first state con-
stitutions because the Federal Constitution gave the President 
traditional executive functions which the state governors had been de-
nied.166 There is, however, a complicating factor regarding the pro-
Executive trend that pro-Executive scholars have not addressed: 
although it is true that the first state constitutions gave the Governor 
substantial authority over war matters, the later constitutions, surpris-
ingly, assigned the Governor less such power. For example, South 
Carolina and Virginia, the two states that in the 1770s enacted consti-
tutions with clauses specifically allocating war power, involved the 
Governor in the exercise of that power.167 Virginia's 1786 constitu-
para. 1 (David Wallace Carrithers ed., University of California Press 1977). Although 
Chapter 6 is headed "Of the Constitution of England," examination of the text shows that 
Montesquieu is not merely describing the English system of Government, but prescribing 
the proper governmental framework. See ANNE M. COHLER, MONTESQUIEU's COMPARATIVE 
POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 104 (1988). The first category of 
executive power encompassed the power to "mak[e] peace or war." MoNTESQUIEU, supra 
at bk. XI, ch. 6, para. 21. 
163 THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
Hamilton's recognition that the Executive possessed these attributes was in accordance 
with the standard formulation. See, e.g., 1 Farrand, supra note 27, at 140 (Dickinson) 
(proper attributes of executive include "[s]ecrecy, vigor & despatch [sic]" and "responsibil-
ity");James Iredell, Answer.s to Mr. Mason's Objections, in PM!PHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 351, 352 (Paul Forded., 1888) ("One of the great advantages at-
tending a single Executive power is the degree of secrecy and dispatch with which on 
critical occasions such a power can act."). 
164 See FoRREST McDoNALD, Novus 0RDO SECLORUM: THE INTELI.EGrUAL ORIGINS oF 
THE CONSTITUTION 86 (1985). 
165 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 519 
(1969). 
'166 See id. at 521. 
167 South Carolina's 1776 constitution stated, "[T]he president and commander-in-
chief shall have no power to make war or peace ... without the consent of the general 
assembly and legislative council." S.C. CONST. of 1776, an. XXVI. The state's 1778 consti-
tution also provided that the governor "shall have no power to commence war" without 
legislative approval. S.C. CONST. of 1778 art. XXXIII. Likewise, Virginia's 1776 constitu-
tion gave the governor power to "make war" as advised by his executive council. VA. 
CoNST. of 1776, pt. i, § xi. Vermont, although not recognized as a state at the time, passed 
a constitution containing a similar provision. VT. CoNST. of 1777, § xviii. 
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tion was similar. 168 However, the two other state constitutions from 
the 1780s that contained provisions concerning starting war-the 
Maryland Constitution of 1780 and the New Hampshire Constitution 
of 1784-gave the power to initiate war to the legislature alone.169 
Moreover, the M~sachusetts Constitution, despite the fact that it gen-
erally created a strong Executive, gave the legislature the power to 
appoint army and navy officers.170 Thus, the history of the revolution-
ary era state constitutions suggests that treatment of war functions was 
counter-cyclical to the overall trend in separation of powers. 
This point supports a pro-Congress reading of the War Powers 
Clause, but it is hardly conclusive. It merely leads us back to the larger 
question created by the factors stressed in pro-Executive scholarship: 
Why might the Framers, at a time in which they were taking so many 
powers from the Legislature, give Congress alone the power to start 
war? In explaining why the Founders gave the power to initiate war to 
Congress, pro-Congress scholars have highlighted a simple explana-
tion. In the words of Dean Ely, requiring congressional approval 
before the nation went to war, reflected "a determination not to let 
such decisions be taken easily."171 Similarly, Professors Firmage and 
Wormuth observed, "The legislative branch was purposely given the 
war power as a check upon the impulsive use of military force by the 
executive,"172 and Professor Bickel argued that "the Framers of the 
Constitution intended ... to make it harder [to start wars]."173 
Pro-Congress scholars point to a number of statements made by 
the Founders as an indication that, because the Founders believed 
presidents would be war-prone, they designed the Constitution to 
make war less likely by circumventing the Executive and granting Con-
gress sole warmaking power. As previously noted, Wilson wrote that 
"[t]his system will not hurry us into war .... It will not be in the 
power of a single man ... to involve us in such distress .... "174 Simi-
larly, Madison wrote Jefferson: "The constitution supposes, what the 
History of all ... [Governments] demonstrates, that the Ex[ecutive] is 
the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to it. It 
has accordingly with studied care, vested the question of war in the 
168 See VA. CaNST. of 1786, ch. ii, art. xi (Governor to "make war" as advised by Execu-
tive Council). 
169 See Mo. CaNST. of 1780, ch. ii, art. vii; N.H. CaNST. of 1784, pt. ii, cl. 10. 
170 See MAss. CaNST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. II, 4, art. 1. For a discussion of this Massachu-
setts clause, see Flaherty, supra note 31, at 1770. 
171 ELY, supra note 8, at 3. 
172 WORMUTH ET AL., supra note 14, at 179. 
173 Bickel, supra note 7, at 131-32. 
174 2 Elliot, supra note 107, at 528. For use of this quote as support for a pro-Congress 
reading of the war power, see, e.g., WORMUTH ET AI-, supra note 14, at 30. 
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Legisl[ature]."175 Jefferson wrote Madison that the system gave an "ef-
fectual check to the Dog of war,"176 and early treatise-writer William 
Rawle opined that "every possible precaution should be used before a 
nation is plunged into [war]."177 
Yet the question remains why the Founders would have thought 
this an area in which the President was less prudent than Congress-
given that they repeatedly stated in a range of other contexts that it 
was legislative abuses of power that most needed to be guarded 
against.178 Moreover, why did they think that the path to war had to 
be slowed? Perhaps because most of the pro-Congress literature is 
shaped by an explicit or unstated view that the war in Vietnam was a 
tragic mistake,179 it is typically assumed that the Founders would have 
wanted to avoid war. But the Founders themselves engaged in warfare 
with some frequency. Not only had the new republic fought success-
fully for independence in the Revolutionary War, but before it was 
twenty-five years old, it had engaged in a series of wars with Native 
Americans; launched military actions against the Barbary states; and 
fought the world's two most formidable military powers-France, in 
the undeclared naval "Quasi-War" of 1798 to 1800, and Great Britain, 
in the War of 1812.180 Given early America's apparent proclivity for 
armed conflict, it cannot simply be assumed that, even if the Founders 
thought the' President was particularly likely to lead the nation into 
war, they would have thought such inclination was a bad thing. Thus, 
some explanation is required as to why they would have thought that 
the President was too likely to lead the nation to war. 
This Part has so far focused on the evidentiary weaknesses of the 
pro-Congress reading of the Constitution. However, one significant 
evidentiary problem undermines the positions advanced by both pro-
Congress and pro-Executive scholars: the fact that relevant evidence 
strongly indicates that the predominant view was that the President 
did not have the power to veto declarations of war. Early statements 
about the War Powers Clause repeatedly feature the assertion that the 
decision to declare war is Congress's alone, and that the Executive has 
175 Letter from james Madison to Thomas jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798), in 2 THE REPUBLIC 
OF LEITERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS jEFFERSON AND jAMES MADISON 1776-
1826, at 1031, 1032 Qames Morton Smith ed., 1995) [hereinafter REPUBLIC OF LEITERS]. 
For use of these quotes, see, e.g., Et.v, supra note 8, at 3-4. 
176 Letter from Thomas jefferson to james Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 1 REPuBuc oF 
LEITERS, supra note 175, at 631, 635. 
177 WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
109 (2d ed. 1829). 
178 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 334-38 Uames Madison) Qacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 483-84 (Alexander Hamilton) Uacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). See also RAKovE, supra note 134, at 309-16. 
179 See Bobbitt, supra note 15, at 1373. 
180 See SoFAER, supra note 14, at 131-66, 208-24, 279-336. 
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no role in the matter. · For example, in 1793 George Washington 
wrote, "The Constitution vests the power of declaring war in Congress; 
therefore no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken 
until after they have deliberated upon the subject and authorized 
such a measure."181 During the same year, James Madison similarly 
declared that it was "the simple, the received and the fundamental 
doctrine of the constitution, that the power to declare war ... is fully 
and exclusively vested in the legislature; that the executive has no right, 
in any case to decide the question, whether there is or is not cause for 
declaring war .... "182 Furthermore, while President, Jefferson ac-
knowledged that "Congress alone is constitutionally invested with the 
power of changing our condition from peace to war."183 In fact, Chief 
Justice Marshall ruled that "[t]he whole powers of war being, by the 
constitution of the United States, vested in congress, the· acts of that 
body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this inquiry [of whether 
'war' existed]."184 
Also significant are President John Adams's actions regarding the 
Quasi-War with France and the legislature's response to them. In 
1798, the Federalist congressional caucus debated whether to seek a 
vote of Congress declaring war against France-a declaration that Ad-
ams, a Federalist, opposed. Adams's position against a declaration of 
war; the motions on the floor of Congress in favor of a declaration of 
war; and the abandonment of those motions after the caucus's vote 
not to pursue war have been frequently discussed.185 Strikingly, there 
181 GEORGE WASHINGTON, 10 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 367 (Jared Sparks 
ed., 1836). 
182 "Helvidius" Number 4, supra note 35, at 106, 108. 
183 ANNAI.S OF CoNG., 9th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (Dec. 1805). 
184 Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801). See also United States v. Smith, 
27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230.31 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342) (power to make war "exclusively 
vested in congress"). The one proponent of a different view of the War Powers Clause was 
St. George Tucker. In his appendix to Blackstone's Commentaries, Tucker wrote, "With us 
the representatives of the people have the right to decide this 'important question [whether 
to declare war], conjunctively with the supreme executive who may, on this occasion as on 
every other, (except a proposal to amendment the constitution,) exercise a qualified nega-
tive on the joint resolutions of congress .... " ST. GEORGE TucKER, BlACKSTONE's CoMMEN· 
TARIES (1803), excerpted in 3 THF. FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 101, 102 (Phillip B. Kurland & 
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Tucker's statement indicates that there was not a consensus on 
the question of whether the President had a veto over the power to declare war. Moreover, 
Tucker was a prominent judge, legal educator, and lawyer, so his opinion deserves weight. 
At the same time, he had not been a member of the Philadelphia convention or- his state 
ratifYing convention, and, as indicated in the text, the predominant view was that the Con-
gress alone had responsibility for determining whether war was declared. For information 
on Tucker's career, see CHARLF.S T. CuLLEN, ST. GEORGE TucKER AND LAw IN VIRGINIA, 
1772-1804, at 186-89 (1987); Treanor, judicial Review, supra note 5, at 520.21. 
185 For leading secondary accounts, see ALEXANDER DF.CONDE, THE QuASI-WAR: THE 
POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE UNDEClARED WAR WITH FRANCE, 1797-1801, at 103-141 
(1966); BRADFORD PERKINS, 1 THF. CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RElATIONS: 
THE CREATION OF A REPUBLICAN EMPIRE, 1776-1865, at 105-07 (Warren I. Cohen ed., 1993); 
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is no mention in any of this material of the possibility of a presidential 
veto of a congressional decision to declare war. This implies that it 
was understood that the President did not have the power to veto dec-
larations of war. Presumably, if anyone thought that ·the President 
had such veto power, that fact would have entered into the discussions 
of whether Congress should declare war over the President's opposi-
tion. Furthermore, when Congress debated whether to declare war, 
numerous legislators stated that the decision whether to go to war was 
Congress's alone. For example, Congressman Sitgreaves declared: 
The House know[s] that, by the distribution of powers under this 
Government, it is only competent for Congress to declare the coun-
try in war; therefore, until that declaration is made by this depart-
ment, the Executive and Judiciary cannot act in the same way as if 
the country was at war_l86 
Made in the teeth of presidential opposition, such statements strongly 
suggest a belief that the President had no role of any kind-including 
a veto-in the decision whether to declare war. 
Moreover, in his 1812 message asking Congress for a declaration 
of war, President Madison made clear that the decision about whether 
to declare war was, under the Constitution, purely a matter for 
Congress: 
Whether the United States shall continue passive under these 
progressive usurpations and these accumulating wrongs, or, oppos-
ing force to force in defense of their national rights, shall commit a 
just cause into the hands of the Almighty Disposer of Events ... is a 
solemn question which the Constitution wisely confides to the legis-
lative department of the Government. In recommending it to their 
early deliberations I am happy in the assurance that the decision 
will be worthy the enlightened and patriotic councils of a virtuous, a 
free, and a powerful nation. 187 
SoFAER, supra note 14, at 144-45. Adams provides two additional accounts of the incident, 
one full and one partial. See John Adams, To the Printers of the Boston Patriot [hereinafter 
Boston Patriot], in 9 THE WoRKS OF joHN ADAMS 241, 304-05 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 
1854) [hereinafter ADAMs WoRKS] (full account of 1809); id. at 305 n.1 (fragment account 
of 1801). 
186 ANNALS OF CoNG., 5th Cong., 2117 (July 1798). See also id. at 1321 (Congressman 
Baldwin: "[T]he subject seemed to be placed wholly in the hands of the Legislature."); id. 
at 1324 (referring to statement of Congressman Nicholas: "[H]e had never heard it 
doubted that Congress had the power over the progress of what led to war, as well as the 
power of declaring war."); id. at 1336 (referring to statement of Congressman Pinckney: 
"Mr. P. agreed that this was Legislative power, and not Executive."). 
187 James Madison, Message to the Senate and House of Representatives (June 1, 
1812), in 2 A COMPilATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 484, 489-90 
(James D. Richardson ed., 1897) [hereinafter CoMPilATION]. 
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The day after Congress voted to declare war, Madison issued "A Proc-
lamation," which asserted that the United States was in a state of war 
because of congressional action: 
Whereas the Congress of the United States, by virtue of the 
constituted authority vested. in them,. have declared by their act 
bearing date the 18th day of the present month that war exists be-
tween the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the 
dependencies thereof and the United States of America and their 
Territories .... 188 
Surprisingly, given the wealth of literature on the original intent 
of the War Powers Clause, no scholar has argued that the original 
understanding was that the President could not veto a declaration of 
war. This is particularly striking because modern scholars have ar-
gued on textualist grounds that the War Powers Clause means precisely 
what it says-that "Congress shall have power ... To declare War"-
and the President cannot veto such declarations.189 Only two schol-
ars, Dean Ely and Gregory Sidak, have even raised the possibility that 
the original understanding was that the President could not veto dec-
larations of war, and they dismiss the possibility rapidly.190 Instead, 
they argue on purely textual ground that declarations of war fall 
within Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 of the Constitution, the Present-
ment Clause, which requires that every congressional "Order, Resolu-
tion, or Vote" be presented to the President for his signature or 
veto.191 The problem with this argument is that the Framers under-
stood the Presentment Clause narrowly. That is, if all congressional 
orders, resolutions, and votes must be presented to the President, this 
presumably applies, not just to declarations of war, but also to con-
gressional proposals for constitutional amendments. However, in the 
1798 case Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 192 the one early Presentment 
Clause case, the Supreme Court rejected the claim that the Eleventh 
188 James Madison, A Proclamation (June 12, 1812), in 2 CoMPilATION, supra note 187, 
at 497. 
189 For the most complete argument on point, see Carter, supra note 26, at 129-32. See 
also Bobbitt, supra note 15, at 1385 n.69 ("[I] t seems clear from the language of the Consti-
tution that the President cannot veto a declaration .... "). 
190 SeeELv, supra note 8, at 231 n.21; Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DuKE LJ. 27, 84 
(1991). 
191 U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. In its entirety, the clause reads: 
I d. 
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote, to Which the Concurrence of the Senate 
and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of 
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and 
before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disap-
proved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of 
Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the 
Case of a Bill. 
192 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). 
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Amendment was invalid because it had not been signed by the Presi-
dent. The Court obsexved that the Presentment Clause "applies only 
to the ordinary cases of legislation .... "193 A congressional declara-
tion of war, like a congressional decision to propose amendments, 
would seem to fall outside the category of "ordinary cases of 
legislation." 
The other principal piece of evidence on which Ely and Sidak 
rely is that Madison signed the declaration of war against England 
which Congress passed in 1812.194 But Presidents sign documents for 
political reasons-even when they know the signature has no legal 
consequence-in order to highlight a personal endorsement. For ex-
ample, despite Hollingswarth, on the eve of the Civil War, President 
Buchanan signed the congressionally-approved Corwin Amendment, 
which would have barred subsequent amendments banning slavery,195 
and President Lincoln signed the Thirteenth Amendment after it was 
approved by Congress in 1865.196 The real question is not whether 
Madison signed the declaration, but what significance he attached to 
that signing. Evidence of Madison's intent can be found in his previ-
ously-quoted message to Congress and his proclamation following the 
declaration of war. Neither document is discussed by Ely or Sidak. 
Both documents, however, clearly state that the decision whether to 
go to war is purely congressional. According to Madison's war 
message, "[T]he Constitution wisely confides [the decision about 
whether to go to war] to the legislative department of the Govern-
ment."197 And, according to Madison's proclamation, "[The Mem-
bers of] Congress ... have declared [war] by their act." 19S The 
President is not part of the process. Ely's and Sidak's position is fur-
ther undercut by the evidence concerning the 1798 controversy over 
whether to go to war with France (a subject that neither discusses).199 
That previous commentators-both pro-Congress and pro-Execu-
tive-have not even raised the issue of a presidential veto may reflect 
the fact that, under either view of the original understanding, it would 
make no sense for the President to be without veto power. If the 
Founders sought to ensure that the President was intimately involved 
in all matters of foreign policy, as pro-Executive scholars maintain, he 
193 Id. at 381 n.*. 
194 See ELY, supra note 8, at 231 n.21; Sidak, supra note 190, at 84. 
195 See RicHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LovE THE 
CoNSTITUTION So MuCH, WHY Do WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 91 (1993). 
196 See id. at 100. 
197 Madison, Message to the Senate and House of Representatives, supra note 187, at 
490. See also supra text accompanying note 186. 
198 Madison, A Proclamation, supra note 188, at 497. See also supra text accompanying 
note 187. 
199 See supra text accompanying notes 185-86. 
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should obviously have been equipped with veto power over warmaking 
decisions. Similarly, if the Founders sought to slow the path to war by 
constructing all possible barriers to war, as pro-Congress scholars 
maintain, a presidential veto would be one obvious barrier. 
The remainder of this Article seeks to answer the question posed 
in this Part: Why would the Founders have given Congress the power 
to initiate war at the same time they denied the President a veto over 
those declarations? There are several reasons why the Founders 
might not have wanted to give the President much, if any, power over 
the decision whether to go to war. In addition, examination of the 
Founders' writings suggests that the continuing power of English op-
positionist thought likely influenced the structuring of the War Pow-
ers Clause. That ideology made the Founders particularly fearful that 
unconstrained Executive control of the military would enable the 
President to seize power directly or to undermine the system of gov-
ernment indirectly through his use of patronage and the financial as-
sets at his disposal.200 However, this factor was at least as much a 
concern at the start of the Revolution as it was at the time of the Fed-
eral Constitution, yet to the extent that they dealt with the matter, the 
first state constitutions involved the Governor in the warmaking deci-
sion.201 Therefore, an additional explanation is needed for why the 
Founders might have become convinced that the President should be 
excluded from the decision to go to war, even- as he was being re-
invested with so many powers. In offering such an explanation, this 
Article will turn to a topic whose relationship to the War Powers 
Clause has gone wholly unexplored-the Framers' conception of 
fame. 
II 
FAME 
In his 1967 essay, Fame and the Founding Fathers, Douglass Adair 
advanced the novel argument that the Framers' conception of fame 
played a critical role in shaping their actions. 202 Adair began by con-
trasting the "explosion of [political] talent" in late eighteenth century 
America with the comparative dearth of such talent in the modern 
United States.203 He noted that the nation that produced "a Hamil-
200 For a detailed discussion of these concerns, see WILU PAUL ADAMs, THE FIRST AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBUCAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
IN THE REvoLUTIONARY ERA 10, 274 (Rita & Robert Kimber trans., 1980); CHARLES ROYSTER, 
A REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE AT WAR: THE CONTINENTAL ARMY AND AMERICAN CHARACTER, 
1775-1783, at 35-38 (1979). 
201 See supra text accompanying notes 164-66. 
202 See ADAIR, supra note 32. 
203 Id. at 5. 
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ton, a Dickinson, a Rutledge, and the galaxy of great Virginians" had a 
population "slightly less than that of Wzsconsin."204 He added: 
Virginia in 1790, the largest of the states, contained just over seven 
hundred thousand people, if one counts the slaves as well as free 
inhabitants; but this state, which produced Washington, Mason, 
Henry, Jefferson, Madison, Marshall, had a total white population, 
including women and children, of about four hundred thousand 
souls. This is much smaller in number than such modern spawning 
grounds of political genius as the Wilkes-Barre metropolitan area or 
Phoenix, Arizona. 205 
These comparisons suggested an obvious question: "How can we ac-
count for this amazing concentration of political ability in this genera-
tion born into a tiny nation on the fringe of the Atlantic?"2°6 
The answer lies in the fact that "lust for the psychic reward of 
fame, honor, glory, after 1776 be [came] a key ingredient in the behav-
ior of Washington and his greatest contemporaries."207 Following 
eighteenth century usage, Adair defined fame as: 
the action or behavior of a "great man," who stands out, who towers 
above his fellows in some spectacular way. To be famous or re-
nowned means to be widely spoken of by a man's contemporaries 
and also to act in such a way that posterity remembers his name and 
his actions. . . . The love of fame encourages a man to make history, 
to leave the mark of his deeds and his ideals on the world; it incites 
a man to refuse to be the victim of events and to become an "event-
making" personality-a being never to be forgotten by those later 
generations that will be born into a world his actions helped to 
shape.20S 
Desiring to be remembered, the Framers became great. 
Three reasons explain why this desire for fame was particularly 
powerful among the framing generation. Part of the reason was cul-
tural. The writers they read-classical authors such as Plutarch, Cic-
ero, and Aristotle, as well as more modem authors such as Machiavelli 
and Francis Bacon-celebrated fame and its pursuit and deemed 
fame an appropriate measure of individual worth. Aristotle declared, 
"'Honor and dishonor are the matters with which the high-minded 
man is especially concerned. "'209 Francis Bacon opined, '"[The] win-
ning of Honour is but the revealing of a man's virtue and worth."'2IO 
And these authors placed the founders of states and the legislators 
204 
205 
206 
207 
208 
209 
210 
!d. at 4. 
!d. at 5. 
!d. 
!d. at 8. 
!d. at 11. 
!d. at 12 n.8 (quoting Aristotle). 
!d. at 14 (quoting Bacon). 
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who created perfect constitutions at, or near, the apex of justly-won 
fame. Thus, Plutarch provided as a model for emulation the "great 
LAWGIVER and the FOUNDER OF A COMMONWEALTH."211 
Machiavelli found "'the Founders of a .Republic'" to be the most 
praiseworthy individuals, except for "'the authors and founders of re-
ligions."'212 Bacon declared the individuals most worthy of fame to be 
the "'FOUNDERS OF STATES AND COMMONWEALTHS[,] such as 
... Romulus, Cyrus, Ottoman, and Julius Caesar. "'213 
Second, Adair contended that many of the Framers had no faith 
in a heavenly afterlife.214 Fame was important to them because it of-
fered them what religion no longer could: immortality. "[W] e must 
recognize," Adair wrote, "[that] the hope of fame like the hope of 
Christian immortality is a mode for dealing with proud Death and 
conquering him."215 
Finally, the Founders became obsessed with fame because the 
Revolutionary War proved that great fame was attainable. Despite 
their generally high ambition, the Founders nonetheless had limited 
aspirations before the war. "'When 1 was young,"' Adams wrote Jeffer-
son in 1813, "'the Summum Bonum in Massachusetts was to be worth 
ten thousand pounds Sterling, ride in a Chariot, be a Colonel of a 
Regiment of Militia and hold a seat in his Majesty's Council. No 
Man's Imagination aspired to anything higher beneath the skies."'216 
Even Hamilton, one of the few Founders who dreamt of personal 
glory years before the Revolution, dreamt almost modestly: he 
fantasized about following in the steps of General James Wolfe who 
won immortality, a great victory for his country, and death on the 
Plains of Abraham.217 The Revolution opened previously unimagin-
able horizons. According to Adair, "As the War for Independence en-
larges the provincial stage upon which they act their roles to that of a 
world theater, the greatest of the great generation develop an almost 
obsessive desire for fame. They become fantastically concerned with 
posterity's judgment of their behavior."218 And so, to take two exam-
ples, Adams came to develop "a sort of pathology of 'the love of 
fame' "219 while Hamilton became consumed with a "demonic passion 
211 Id. at 13 (citing Plutarch). 
212 
213 
214 
215 
Id. at 15 n.12 (quoting Machiavelli). 
Id. at 14-15 (quoting Bacon). 
See id. at 12. 
I d. 
216 Id. at 6 (quotingjohn Adams). 
217 See id. at 7. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 3. 
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for fame,"220 and adopted a somewhat grander role model than 
Wolfe: Julius Caesar.22I 
Thus, Adair concludes that the Founders' desire for fame made 
possible national independence and the creation of the republic.222 
Their concern for immortality "bec[a]me[] a spur and a goad that 
urge[d] some ofthem to act with a nobleness and greatness that their 
earlier careers had hardly hinted at."223 
Although a number of historians and students of the Founding 
Fathers have explored Adair's insight,224 legal scholars have mistak-
enly ignored it, despite the wealth of writings on original intent. The 
same concern with fame that Adair saw as guiding the personal ac-
tions of the Founders also profoundly influenced their thinking about 
governance. "[L] ove of fame," Hamilton wrote, is "the ruling passion 
of the noblest minds, which would prompt a man to plan and under-
take extensive and arduous enterprises for the public benefit."225 
"[L] ove of fame,'; declared Gouverneur Morris at the constitutional 
convention, "is the great spring to noble & illustrious actions."226 
"The love of honest and well earned fame is deeply rooted in honest 
and susceptible minds,'' James Wilson asserted.227 He then rhetori-
cally asked, 
Can there be a stronger incentive to the operations of this passion, 
than the hope of becoming the object of well founded and distin-
guishing applause? Can there be a more complete gratification of 
this passion, than the satisfaction of knowing that this applause is 
given-that it is given upon the most honourable principles, and 
acquired by the most honourable pursuits?228 
220 Id. at 16 n.14. 
221 See id. at 16. 
222 See id. at 8. 
223 Id. 
224 For works that follow Adair in exploring the influence of the concept of fame on 
the Founders, see RICHARD BROOKHISER, FOUNDING FATHER: REDISCOVERING GEORGE WASH-
INGTON (1996); MICHAEL LIENESCH, NEW ORDER OF THE AGES: TIME, THE CONSTITUTION, 
AND THE MAKING OF MoDERN AMERICAN PoLmCAL THOUGHT (1988); PAUL A RAHE, REPUB-
LICS ANCIENT AND MODERN: CLASSICAL REPUBLICANISM AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(1992); GARRY WILLS, CINCINNATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTEN-
MENT (1984); Bruce Miroff, john Adams: Merit, Fame, and Political Leadership, 48 J. PoL. 116 
(1986). For a history of"fame" through the ages, see LEO BRAUDY, THE FRENZVOF RENOWN: 
FAME & ITS HISTORY (1986). 
225 THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
226 2 Farrand, supra note 27, at 53. 
227 1 THE WoRKS OF jAMES WILSON 405 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). 
228 Id. Wilson also wrote: 
The love of reputation and the fear of dishonour are, by the all-gracious 
Author of our existence, implanted in our breasts, for purposes the most 
beneficent and wise. Let not these principles be deemed the growth of 
dispositions only which are weak or vain; they flourish most luxuriantly in 
minds, the strongest and, let me add, the most humble. 
2 id. at 593. 
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John Adams observed that "if the citizens, or a m.Yority of them, or 
any party or individual of them, in action and practice, preferred the 
public to their private interest, as many undoubtedly would, it would 
not be from any such passion as love of the democracy." Such a pref-
erence was instead likely rooted in "a desire of fame, and the ap-
plause, gratitude, and rewards of the public."229 
At the same time, the Framers did not see the desire for fame as 
wholly beneficial. Their conception of a "passion" for fame followed 
David Hume's approach. In classifying the "love of fame" as a "pas-
sion," Hume conceived of the attraction of fame as emotional rather 
than rational in nature, and he therefore broke with the classical cele-
bration of the quest for fame.230 Thus, for the Framers, while love of 
fame could inspire individuals to serve the polity, it also could harm, 
and even endanger, when not properly channeled and constrained. 
Although the proper future audience was the wise and good, an indi-
vidual, fearful of being forgotten, might care more about simply being 
remembered, rather than by whom or for what. The haunting exam-
ple from antiquity of Herostratus burning down the beautiful Temple 
of Diana at Ephesus so that his memory would be immortal231 teaches 
that the desire for such immortality can triumph over concern for 
others. Adams was cognizant of this danger wh~n he wrote: 
With what impatience does the man of spirit and ambition, who is 
depressed by his situation, look round for some great opportunity 
to distinguish himself? No circumstances, which can afford this ap--
pear to him undesirable; he even looks fonvard with satisfaction to 
the prospect of foreigu war, or civil dissension; and with secret 
transport and delight, sees, through all the confusion and blood-
shed which attend them, the probability of those wished-for occa-
sions presenting themselves, in which he may draw upon himself 
the attention and admiration of mankind.2s2 
Hamilton, too, warned of the dangers posed by the "man of irregular 
ambition" driven by his love of fame and power.2ss 
Furthermore, the Founders did not consider their peers immune 
from the corruption caused by love of fame. For example, when Ham-
ilton, after dinner with Jefferson one evening in 1791, declared, "The 
greatest man that ever lived, was Julius Caesar," Jefferson concluded, 
229 John Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States, 
in 6 ADAMS WORKS, supra note 185, at 210 [hereinafter Adams, Defence]. 
230 See DAviD HUME, A TREATISE OF HuMAN NATURE 316-24 (LA Selby-Bigge ed., 1888) 
(discussing "love of fame" in the section of the book on "Passions"). For a discussion of the 
influence of Hume on the Founders with respect to their conception of fame, see RAHE, 
supra note 224, at 565-66. 
231 See BRAUDY, supra note 224, at 51. 
232 John Adams, Discourses on Davila; A Series of Papers on Political History, in 6 
ADAMs WORKS, supra note 185, at 260 [hereinafter Adams, Davila]. 
233 THE FEDERALIST No. 72, supra note 225, at 340 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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as he wrote Benjamin Rush, that Hamilton intended to overthrow the 
government in order to achieve a place in history like Caesar's.234 Fit-
tingly, a few months later Rush received a letter from Adams accusing 
Jefferson of illegitimately pursuing glory. Adams wrote: "The Decla-
ration of Independence I always considered as a theatrical show. Jef-
ferson ran away with all the stage effect of that ... and all the glory of 
it."235 As Leo Braudy has explained, "It is impossible to read the let-
ters and sometimes even the public statements of virtually any one of 
the Founding Fathers without quickly finding an attack on one or sev-
eral of the others for their ambition, their greed for praise, their van-
ity, and so on. "236 
Thus, a crucial problem in structuring government became how 
to control the desire for fame and renown. In his Discourses on Davila, 
Adams observed, "The desire of the esteem of others is as real a want 
of nature as hunger."237 He added, "It is a principal end of govern-
ment to regulate this passion, which in its turn becomes a principal 
means of government."238 Returning to the subject later in the book, 
the future President quoted with approval Adam Smith's observation, 
"To those who have been accustomed to the possession, or even to the 
hope of public admiration, all other pleasures sicken and decay," and 
then framed his discussion around a question posed by the poet john-
son: "Heroes proceed! What bonds your pride shall hold?" "The an-
swer," Adams wrote, "can be none other than this, that, as nature has 
established in the bosoms of heroes no limits to those passions; and as 
the world, instead of restraining, encourages them, the check must be 
in the form of government."239 Adams's choice of language is signifi-
cant. Government does not seek to root out the desire for applause; it 
seeks only to "check" it, to "regulate" it, to convert it into "a principal 
means of government." Similarly, in discussing the proper response 
to a person's "love of fame," Hamilton urged that it be harnessed, not 
eradicated: "[T]he desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives 
of human conduct, [and] the best security for the fidelity of mankind 
is to make their interest coincide with their duty."240 
According to one important group of scholars, the Founders of 
the Constitution concluded that individuals inevitably pursued eco-
234 See ADAIR, supra note 32, at 13-14 (quoting from letter written by Thomas jefferson 
to Benjamin Rush datedJan. 16, 1811) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
235 Letter from john Adams to Benjamin Rush Qune 21, 1811), in THE SPUR OF FAME: 
DIALOGUES OF JoHN ADAMs AND BENJAMIN RusH, 1805-1813, at 180, 182 Qohn A Schutz & 
Douglass Adair eds., 1966) [hereinafter SPUR]. 
236 BRAUDY, supra note 224, at 455-56. 
237 Adams, Davila, supra note 232, at 234. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 262-63. 
240 THE FEDERALIST No. 72, supra note 225, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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nomic self-interest, and therefore the Founders sought to create a sys-
tem of governance that would channel that drive in a beneficial 
fashion and contain it when it posed a harm to the polity.241 In Crea-
tion of the American Republic, the most influential work of this school of 
thought, Gordon Wood contended that this acceptance of the pursuit 
of economic self-interest as legitimate (or at least as an unavoidable 
aspect of human nature) marked a sharp departure from the republi-
canism that had been the dominant mode of thought at the start of 
the Revolutionary Era.242 In republicanism, a principal, and perhaps 
the principal, purpose of the polity was to inculcate virtue-the sacri-
fice of individual interest to the commonweal. 243 According to Wood, 
the Framers decisively rejected this view and accepted liberalism. 244 
Similarly, in Democracy and Th~ Federalist, a classic explication of the 
view that the Founders accepted selfinterest as part of the constitu-
tional system, Martin Dia!nond argued that Madison saw "the real 
problem in popular government ... [as] the majority faction, i.e., the 
great mass of the little propertied and unpropertied."245 Federalist No. 
10, according to Diamond, is premised on the view that this threat 
could not be resolved by an appeal to" 'moral and religious motives' 
whose efficacy [Madison] deprecated."246 Rather, it was to be mas-
tered by pitting economic interest against economic interest. "[T]he 
struggle of interests is a safe, even energizing, struggle which is com-
patible with, or even promotes, the safety and stability of society. "247 
Thus, the Founders solved "the problem posed by the dangerous pas-
sions and interests of the many ... primarily by a reliance upon pas-
sion and interest themselves."24S 
More recent scholarship-including new work by Wood249-has 
indicated that the story of ideological transformation that Wood de-
picted in Creation of the American Republic was too stark and that, while 
241 See, e.g., DREw R. McCoY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: PoLITICAL EcoNoMY IN jEFFERSO-
NIAN AMERICA 120-35 (1980); McDoNALD, supra note 164, at 188-89; WooD, supra note 165, 
at 606-15; William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the just 
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE LJ. 694, 695-700, 704-05 (1985). 
242 See WooD, supra note 165, at 606-15. For a discussion of Wood's influence, see 
Daniel T. Rogers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11, 15-24 (1992); 
Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 5, at 819-24. 
243 See WooD, supra note 165, at 65-70, 413-20. 
244 See id. at 606-15. 
245 Martin Diamond, Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent, 
53 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 52, 64 (1959). 
246 Id. at 66 (quoting Federalist No. 10). 
247 Id. 
248 ld. See also ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGU-
MENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1977); McCOY, supra note 241. 
249 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 243-70 
(1991). 
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republicanism grew less influential, it was still important at the time of 
the framing. For example, Isaac Kramnick has written: 
Federalists and Antifederalists ... tapped several languages of poli-
tics . . . . None dominated the field, and the use of one was compat-
ible with the use of another by the same writer or speaker. There 
was a profusion and confusion of political tongues among the foun-
ders. They lived easily with that clatter; it is we, two hundred and 
more years later, who chafe at their inconsistency.250 
There is currently a broad (although not universal) acceptance 
among historians of the view that, at the time of the founding, both 
republican and liberal ideas were widely held and that both affected 
constitutional discourse.251 Thus, the Framers were concerned both 
with harnessing self-interest and with promoting virtue.252 
The Founders' comments about fame and glory are in accord 
with this account, suggesting parallels between the Constitution's 
treatment of economic self-interest and its treatment of the desire for 
fame. In the classical republican vision, the desire for fame was an 
unmitigated good: "the noblest of the passions."253 The attitude of 
the Founders towards fame represents a tempering-but not a rejec-
tion-of this initial vision through the collective experience of a fa-
mous generation. Thus, the Founders had a complex view of fame, 
seeing it as an impetus for great deeds and as an impetus for great 
harms; fame was both a manifestation of virtue and a possible threat 
to the polity. The Constitution the Founders created reflects this 
complexity. It seeks to facilitate the pursuit of fame, to harness the 
pursuit of fame and to check the pursuit of fame-all at the same 
time. 
The Constitution reflects this strategy in a number of different 
ways. For example, Hamilton invoked the love of fame as a reason not 
to bar presidential re-election. The bar would "deter" the President 
from beginning large-scale enterprises "when he foresaw that he must 
quit the scene, before he could accomplish the work, and must com-
mit that, together with his own reputation, to hands which might be 
unequal or unfriendly to the task."254 Morris also invoked the love of 
250 ISAAC KRAMNICK, REPUBLICANISM AND BOURGEOIS RADICALISM: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
IN LATE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND AND AMERICA 261 (1990). 
251 See, e.g., jOYCE APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE HISTORICAL IMAGINA-
TION 322-39 (1992); LIENESCH, supra note 224, at 78;jENNIFER NEDEI.SKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY 
AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 177-83 (1990); WOOD, supra note 249, at 
243-70; Lance Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New 
American Republic, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 12 (1986); Lance Banning, Quid Transit? Paradigms 
and Process in the Transformation of Republican Ideas, 17 REvs. IN AM. HIST. 199, 199-200 
(1989) (book review). See also Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 5, at 823-24. 
252 See, e.g., McDoNALD, supra note 164, at 188-90; WooD, supra note 249, at 243-70. 
253 McDONALD, supra note 164, at 190. 
254 THE FEDERALIST No. 72, supra note 225, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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fame as he urged the convention to permit presidential re-election, 
and his argument was more dramatic than Hamilton's. By denying 
the President the continued opportunity for fame, the term limitation 
would "give a dangerous turn to one of the strongest passions in the 
human breast .... Shut the Civil road to Glory & he [the President] 
may be compelled to seek it by the sword."255 
Similarly, the open-ended texture of the Constitution may reflect, 
in part, the Founders' view of the desire for fame and its perils. Anti-
federalists criticized the Constitution for not being specific enough 
and for not putting adequately precise limits on federal governmental 
powers; they were comfortable with the idea that if a Constitution of 
the type they proposed was enacted, it would soon need to be re-
placed.256 The Framers, in contrast, celebrated the timelessness of 
their creation. "Constitutions of civil Government," Hamilton de-
clared, "are not to be framed upon a calculation of existing exigen-
cies; but upon a combination of these, with the probable exigencies of 
ages."257 Such assertions, however, raise the question of why the 
Framers thought it so important that the system they were building 
last forever. Professor Paul Rahe suggests an answer: 
In order that "no manner of Food might be left unto ambition," 
most of [the Founders] even tried what George Washington, like 
Harrington's Lord Archon, actually accomplished: to contrive af-
fairs so that "the minds of men were firme in the opinion, that he 
could be no seeker of himselfe, in the way of earthly Pompe and 
Glory."258 
Thus, the Framers' conception of fame makes their desire for consti-
tutional flexibility understandable. As creators of a nation, the Foun-
ders knew how powerful and how dangerous the lust for fame could 
be; they sought to enact a constitution flexible enough to prevent 
tempting future generations of fame-seekers to overturn the polity. 
On a less grand level, the Opinions Clause-empowering the 
President to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer 
in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to 
the Duties of their respective Offices"259-sought to harness individ-
ual concern for fame. James Iredell wrote that the Clause would lead 
255 2 Farrand, supra note 27, at 53. 
256 See LIENESCH, supra note 224, at 145-50. 
257 THE FEDERAUST No. 34, at 210 (Alexander Hamilton) Uacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
See al5o Treanor & Sperling, supra note 5, at 1942-43 (discussing Framers' conscious choice 
of an open-ended constitution). 
258 RAHE, supra note 224, at 571 (quoting Harrington). See al5o LIENESCH, supra note 
224, at 181 ("Under the new system, Americans were never again to undertake extraordi-
nary political actions, because from that time there were, at least in theory, no more revo-
lutions to be fought and no more constitutions to be founded. Above all, from that time 
there was no more fume to be won .... "). 
259 U.S. CaNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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the Cabinet to weigh the courses of action that they recommended 
with care: "[A written opinion] must for ever afterwards speak for 
itself, and commit the character of the writer, in lasting colors, either 
of fame or infamy, or neutral insignificance, to future ages, as well as 
the present."260 Recognition of the importance of the desire for fame 
also lies behind Adams's attempt to create titles for the holders of 
national office. For example, he proposed to the Senate that the Pres-
ident be referred to as "His most benign highness."261 Although Ad-
ams's effort met with abuse-it was suggested that Adams be styled 
"His Rotundity"-it was consistent with his belief that, unless the de-
sire for distinction was used to attract people to the public life, they 
would wholly abandon it for the private realm. 262 
Finally, the Founders' conception of the desire for fame also pro-
vides an explanation for the constitutional provisions concerning the 
military. As the Founders reflected on fame and its significance for 
constitutional government, the desire for military glory became a par-
ticular focus of concern. The Revolution had made only one individ-
ual a world figure: the nation's military leader, George 
Washington.263 And Washington had devoutly sought that fame. 
Richard Brookhiser has recently written that Washington "hoped his 
reputation would be honored in later years by the country he had 
made and celebrated by its poets."264 His contemporaries acknowl-
edged his preeminent fame, although not all thought it just. Writing 
about the fact that Washington was treated as the greatest leader of 
the Revolutionary War, Adams sarcastically observed to Benjamin 
Rush that "mankind bow down with [the most] reverence" to "bloody 
battles and splendid victories."265 "The French and American Revolu-
tions differed from each other in many things," Rush wrote Adams, 
"but they were alike in one particular-the former gave all its power to 
a single man, the latter all its fame." 266 While Rush and Adams de-
plored this state of affairs, Jefferson celebrated it. In his Notes on the 
State of Virginia, Jefferson argued for America's capacity to produce 
great individuals and listed Washington first: "In war we have pro-
260 James Iredell, Answer.s to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New Constitution, in PAMPHLETS 
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 140, at 335, 348. See also Akhil 
Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REv. 647, 672-74 (1996). 
261 Miroff, supra note 224, at 124. 
262 ld. 
263 See WILLS, supra note 224, at 109-32. The other American to achieve a similar level 
of renown, Benjamin Franklin, had become world famous before the Revolution. See id. at 
199-200. 
264 BROOKHISER, supra note 224, at 135. 
265 Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Rush (Nov. 11, 1807), in SPUR, supra note 
235, at 97. 
266 Letter from Benjamin Rush to John Adams (Aug. 14, 1805), in SPUR, supra note 
235, at 31, 32. 
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duced a Washington, whose memory will be adored while liberty shall 
have votaries, whose name will triumph over time, and will in future 
ages assume its just station among the most celebrated worthies of the 
world .... "267 
Although the Founders disagreed about whether Washington de-
served preeminence, all believed that he was remarkable for having 
been in a position to pursue greater fame and power and for not yield-
ing to the temptation. As George Mason declared, "So disinterested 
and amiable a character as General Washington might never com-
mand again."268 Patrick Henry, as well, stressed the nation's rare for-
tune in having found such a man: 
In great dangers [dictatorial] power has been given.-Rome had 
furnished us with an illustrious example.-America found a person 
worthy of that trust: She looked to Virginia for him. We gave a 
dictatorial power to hands that used it gloriously; and which were 
rendered more glorious by surrendering it up. Where is there a 
breed of such Dictators? Shall we find a set of American Presidents 
of such a breed? Will the American President come and lay pros-
trate at the feet of Congress his laurels? I fear there are few men 
who can be trusted on that head. 269 
Few would have Washington's ability to forsake the opportunity 
to gather the laurels of war. Indeed, the memorial given at Washing-
ton's death suggests that the Senate feared that even he might have 
been tempted to overreach: 
With patriotic pride, we review the life of our WASHINGTON, and 
compare him with those of other countries, who have been pre-emi-
nent in fame. Ancient and modern names are diminished before 
him. Greatness and guilt have too often been allied; but his fame is 
whiter than it is brilliant. . . . The scene is closed, and we are no 
longer anxious lest misfortune should sully his glory .... Favored of 
heaven, he departed without exhibiting the weakness of 
humanity.270 
Given the Founders' conception of the lure of military fame, the 
President was a logical choice to head the military because his desire 
for fame would motivate him to win any wars that the nation waged. At 
the same time, as the next Part will argue, this same desire for military 
glory meant that the President could not be trusted to decide when to 
start war. 
267 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in THOMAS jEFFERSON: WRITINGS 123, 
190 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). 
268 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1378 
(John P. Kaminski & Gas pare J. Saladino eds., 1976) [hereinafter DocUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
269 9 id. at 1058. 
270 ANNALS OF CoNe., 6th Cong. 17 (Dec. 1799). 
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FAME AND THE WAR POWERS ClAUSE 
As previously discussed, at the time the Constitution was drafted 
and ratified, there was little discussion about what the War Powers 
Clause meant. But analysis ofthe ratification debates about war, fame, 
and the Executive reveal a fear of Executive desire to lead the nation 
into war in order to achieve personal glory. These statements thus 
provide the missing link in the argument made by pro-Congress schol-
ars; they suggest the motivation for giving Congress alone the power 
to start war. After surveying evidence from the ratification debates, 
this Part turns to a discussion of the new nation's first foreign policy 
crisis-the Neutrality Crisis of 1793-and focuses on Madison's 
Helvidius letters. In these letters, Madison made explicit the previ-
ously implicit link between concerns about the dangers of the desire 
for fame and the decision to vest the war power in Congress. The Part 
will then tum to John Adams's analysis of Alexander Hamilton's role 
in the Quasi-War of 1798-1800 and the Federalist attacks on the War 
of 1812 as further examples of the early view that an individual's de-
sire for glory could lead him to push the nation into battle. 
A. Constitutional Debates 
As supporters and opponents of the Constitution debated the res-
olution of military questions, they revealed a common belief that 
kings and other individuals with the power to lead their nation into 
war were likely to do so in order to gain personal glory. In other 
words, Adams's observation that "the man of spirit and ambition .. . 
looks forward with satisfaction to the prospect of foreign war ... in 
which he may draw upon himself the attention and admiration of 
mankind" operated with particular force when the person in question 
was a leader who would reap the lion's share of fame from victory.271 
In Federalist No. 4,Johnjay argued that a united country was nec-
essary, among other reasons, to protect against unjust wars initiated by 
European powers. In explaining why European nations were prone to 
initiate such conflicts, he wrote: 
271 
272 
[A]bsolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to 
get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, 
such as, a thirst for military glory . . . . These and a variety of mo-
tives, which affect only the mind of the Sovereign, often lead him to 
engage in wars not sanctified by justice, or the voice and interests of 
his people. 272 
Adams, Davila, supra note 232, at 260. See also supra text accompanying note 232. 
THE FEDERALIST No.4, at 191 UohnJay) Uacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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Thus, the "absolute monarch[ ] ... thirst[ing] for military glory," will 
start wars that "the voice . . . of his people" would counsel against 
starting. In defending the federal taxing power, Hamilton in Federalist 
No. 34 relied on similar assumptions. He contended that the new na-
tion's military needs would be modest, and contrasted them with 
Great Britain's. "[T]he expences incurred in the prosecution of the 
ambitious enterprizes and vain-glorious pursuits of a Monarchy, are 
not a proper standard by which to judge of those which might be nec-
essary in a republic .... "273 Paralleling jay, Hamilton took the posi-
tion that the "ambiti[on]" and "vain-glor[y]" of the monarch would 
cause him to begin wars that would not have been begun by a repub-
lic.274 Significantly, although ambition today is most commonly the 
love of power or wealth, its most common usage in the late eighteenth 
century was, "[t]he desire of preferment or honour."27s 
A Federalist writing under the pen name "Foreign Spectator" also 
suggested that the desire for military glory caused leaders to make 
war: 
[M]ilitary honor . . . is indeed very dazzling .... Yet this honor is 
not sufficient for republics, because it regards war rather as a thea-
tre of glory, than a trial of patriotic virtue, and values a Caesar 
[who] ... to astonish the world by his talents, became its conqueror, 
and the master of his own country. 276 
It is, then, the desire for glory, to "astonish the world by his talents," 
that motivates a Caesar to conquer. To offer one final Federalist ex-
ample, in the Virginia ratifying convention, Federalist leader George 
Nicholas favorably compared the Constitution, which gave Congress 
the power to call out the militia, with the English system, in which the 
monarch held that power. "[The] Prince['s decision would be] gov-
erned by ... ambition, or mere motives of personal interest," while 
Congress "will be actuated by motives of fellow-feeling."277 
The Antifederalists, in fact, shared the Federalists' belief that an 
individual, entrusted with control over the military, would use it to 
gain glory. Patrick Henry proclaimed: 
A republic has this advantage over a monarchy, that its wars are gen-
erally founded on more just grounds. A republic can never enter 
into a war, unless it be a national war-unless it be approved of, or 
desired by the whole community. . . . I call also for an example, 
when a republic has been engaged in a war contrary to the wishes of 
its people. There are thousands of examples, where the ambition of 
273 THE FEDERALJsr No. 34, supra note 257, at 213 (Alexander Hamilton). 
274 Id. 
275 SAMuEL joHNSON, A DicriONARY OF THE ENGLISH l..ANGUAGE 44 (reprinted. 1877). 
276 "Foreign Spectator," Letter to INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER (Sept. 8, 1787), in Docu-
MENTARY HJsrORY, supra note 268, at microfiche supplement 308. 
277 10 id. at 1282. 
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its Prince [has] precipitated a nation into the most destructive 
war.278 
Henry's concern was not simply the narrow one that kings should not 
be given the power to lead a nation to war, but the broader one that 
any one individual-king or not-entrusted with the power to start 
war would use it to achieve personal glory. Thus, commenting on re-
cent Dutch history, he stated: "The glorious republic of Holland has 
erected monuments of her warlike intrepidity and valor: Yet she is 
now totally ruined by a Stadtholder-a Dutch President. The destruc-
tive wars into which that nation has been plunged, has since involved 
her in ambition."279 An Antifederalist writing as "American Citizen" 
took a similar view: "There is a wide difference between the troops of 
such a commonwealth as ours, founded on equal and unalterable princi-
ples, and those of a regal government, where ambition and oppression 
are the profession of the king. "280 
Antifederalist Melancton Smith contrasted the American situa-
tion with the European situation: "The European governments are 
almost all of them framed, and administered with a view to arms, and 
war, as that in which their chief glory consists .... "28I According to 
Smith, personal reasons motivated the monarchs of Europe to declare 
war. He wrote, "Let the monarchs in Europe, share among them the 
glory of depopulating countries . . . . I envy them not the honor, and I 
pray heaven this country may never be ambitious of it. "282 Smith con-
trasted the illusory glory which European monarchs pursued with the 
real glory of substantial achievement: "The czar Peter the great, ac-
quired great glory by his arms; but all this was nothing, compared with 
the true glory which he obtained, by civilizing his rude and barbarous 
subjects, diffusing among them knowledge, and establishing, and cul-
tivating the arts of life . . . . "283 
The various examples of ambition and glory-seeking cited above 
do not directly involve Congress or a democratically-selected Presi-
dent. But neither Antifederalists nor Federalists thought that Ameri-
cans were immune from the fame-seeking and glory-seeking that 
affected Europeans. I have previously discussed the Federalist belief 
that a proper constitution needed to account for the desire for fame. 
Antifederalists were at least as vociferous on this point, with the signifi-
cant difference being that while the Federalists believed that the Con-
278 9 id. at 1068 (alteration in original). 
279 I d. at 1058. 
280 13 id. at 435. 
281 15 id. at 236. 
282 Id. 
283 Id. 
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stitution controlled glory-seeking, the Antifederalists did not. An 
Antifederalist writing as "Denatus" observed: 
[F] or purposes best known to this almighty sovereign of pure good-
ness and order, we are subject to many jarring propensities. Among 
these, vanity, ambition, and the love of riches are not the least. -
While reason and conscience can confine the passions, their action 
and re-action on each other, constitute human happiness. But, 
when they overcome reason and conscience, they produce our mis-
ery. To guard against this misfortune, as much as human foresight 
could discover, ought to have been the chief business of the late 
foederal [sic] convention.284 
In arguing against a standing army, Melancton Smith asked: "Are we 
so much better than the people of other ages and of other countries, 
that the same allurements of power and greatness, which led them 
aside from their duty, will have no influence upon men in our coun-
try?"285 The answer was obvious: "[T] he passion for pomp, power and 
greatness, works as powerfully in the hearts of many of our better sort, 
as it ever did in any country under heaven."286 
Antifederalist "Candidus" made a similar argument against en-
trusting the national government with the war power. As he did, he 
strikingly described the rarity of selfless leaders who refused to misuse 
their power: 
To trust this [war] power in the hands of a few men delegated for 
two, four and six years, is complimenting the ambition of human 
nature too highly, to risque the tranquility of these States on their 
absolute determination. Certain characters now on the stage, we have 
reason to venerate, but though this country is now blessed with a 
Washington, Frnaklin [sic], Hancock and Adams, yet posterity may 
have reason to rue the day when their political welfare depends on 
the decision of men who may fill the places of these worthies.287 
As historian Forrest McDonald has explained, "[I]t was a cliche 
that in public affairs the ruling passions of most men were avarice and 
ambition, the love of money and the love of power or popular ap-
plause."288 Governmental actors were all prone to ambition. But it 
was the individual who acted alone-who had special power, responsi-
bility, and visibility-who was most likely to pursue fame because he 
had the greatest opportunity to achieve it. The legislator did not fall 
into this category. As Madison wrote in Federalist No. 10, "moral ... 
motives" -among which Madison considered concerns about rep uta-
284 10 id. at 1602-03. 
285 15 id. at 463. 
286 15 id. at 463. 
287 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 128-29 (Herbert]. Storing ed., 1981). 
288 McDoNALD, supra note 164, at 163-64. 
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tion289-"lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined 
together."29° But the President, as a lone actor, was likely to be driven 
by fame. Significantly, when Hamilton and Morris spoke about the 
love of fame and what it meant for the American constitutional sys-
tem, their sole focus was on how it would affect presidential action. 291 
In discussing the desire to be known and remembered and the 
consequences of that desire, Adams put the point more broadly: "In 
proportion as men rise higher in the world, whether by election, de-
scent, or appointment, and are exposed to the observation of greater 
numbers of people, the effects of their own passions and of the affec-
tions of others for them become more serious, interesting, and dan-
gerous."292 It is not the mode by which the individual comes to lead a 
nation that matters-whether, for example, he is an hereditary king 
or an elected president-it is the simple fact that he leads a nation 
that makes his passions "serious, interesting and dangerous."293 
In Federalist No. 6, Hamilton made a related point in discussing 
the origins of war. Some wars, he wrote: 
take their origin intirely in private passions; in the attachments, en-
mities, interests, hopes and fears of leading individuals in the com-
munities of which they are members. Men of this class, whether the 
favourites of a king or of a people, have in too many instances 
abused the confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext of 
some public motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national tran-
quility to personal advantage, or personal gratification.294 
Hamilton offered Pericles as his example of a popular favorite who 
had embroiled his nation in conflict for reasons stemming from "pri-
vate passions," the consequence of which was "the ruin of the Athe-
nian commonwealth. "295 In short, the "leading individuals in the 
communit[y]" are likely to use their power to lead their nation into 
war for personal reasons. 296 This is true regardless of whether they 
derive their power from being "the favourites of a king or of a peo-
ple."297 Either way, the consequences are disastrous. 
289 See DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 183 (1984). 
290 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 61 Uames Madison) Uacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). See also 
THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 423 Uames Madison) Uacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (one of the 
advantages of the Senate over the House was that "a sense of national character ... can 
only be found in a number so small, that a sensible degree of the praise and blame of 
public measures may be the portion of each individual."). 
291 See supra text accompanying notes 254-55. 
292 Adams, Davila, supra note 232, at 254. 
293 Id. 
294 
295 
296 
297 
THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 29 (Alexander Hamilton) Uacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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Combined, these statements about fame and war strongly suggest 
why the Framers gave Congress the power to declare war. First, these 
statements are evidence of a widely-held belief among Federalists and 
Antifederalists that kings-the "executive" that they knew-had fre-
quently led their nations into war solely to achieve glory. Second, they 
reveal a widespread conviction that the passions that influenced lead-
ers of a monarchy would also hold sway over leaders of a republic. 
Third, the statements reflect an understanding that the President, the 
head of the new executive branch, was the governmental official most 
likely to pursue fame. These statements lead to the logical, if unex-
pressed, conclusion that the President could not be trusted with the 
power to declare war because, in order to achieve glory, he would lead 
the nation into war when it was not in the national interest. 
Admittedly, this sentiment was not directly expressed in Philadel-
phia or during the ratification debates. However, there was also litde 
discussion of any kind concerning why the power to declare war was 
given to Congress.298 Moreover, in the course of the first prominent 
post-ratification debate about the War Powers Clause, James Madison 
clearly stated that the President's inclination to war because of his de-
sire for fame justified the Framers' grant of the power to declare war 
to Congress. 299 
B. The Helvidius Letters 
In April 1793, President Washington proclaimed American neu-
trality in the war between France and Britain.300 Hamilton, then Sec-
retary of the Treasury, defended both the wisdom of Washington's 
decision and his constitutional power to issue the proclamation in a 
series o~ letters written under the pen name "Pacificus."3°1 Hamilton 
grounded his constitutional claims in the contention that foreign pol-
icy was an Executive function and that congressional powers under 
the Constitution in the foreign policy area were therefore "to be con-
strued strictly-and ought to be extended no further than is essential 
to their execution."302 He acknowledged that Executive actions could 
"affect the ... exercise of the Power of the Legislature to declare war," 
but argued that this did not prevent the President from exercising 
powers granted him under the Constitution.303 According to Hamil-
298 See supra Part I.C. (discussing the ratification debates). 
299 See infra text accompanying notes 305-18. 
300 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 13, at 18. 
301 See LANcE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: jAMES MAmsoN AND THE FOUND-
ING OF THE FEDERAL R.EPUBUG 375-77 (1995); SCHLESINGER, supra note 13, at 18-19. 
302 Alexander Hamilton, Paci.ficus No. 1, in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 
42 (Harold C. Syrett &Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1969) [hereinafter HAMILTON PAPERS]. 
303 Id. 
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ton, "[T]he division of the Executive Power [in the Constitution cre-
ates] ... a concurrent authority, in the distributed cases."304 
Madison was troubled by Washington's proclamation. A letter 
that he wrote Jefferson on June 13, 1793 indicates that he viewed Con-
gress as having the sole power to initiate war, and that he thought the 
Neutrality Proclamation represented an indirect but significant Exec-
utive intrusion on congressional power: 
The right to decide the question whether the duty & interest of the 
U.S. require war or peace under any circumstances, and whether 
their disposition be towards the one or the other seems to be essen-
tially & exclusively involved in the right vested in the Legislature, of 
declaring war in time of peace; and in the P. & S. [President and 
Senate] of making peace in time of war.3os 
As Hamilton's Pacificus Letters appeared in print, Jefferson forwarded 
them to Madison and urged him to write a response: "[T] ake up your 
pen, select the most striking heresies, and cut him to peices [sic] in 
the face of the public. There is nobody else who can & will enter the 
lists with him."306 
Complying with Jefferson's request, Madison wrote five letters 
under the nom de plume "Helvidius."307 Madison's focus was on Hamil-
ton's constitutional argument, rather than on the substantive merit of 
the proclamation. He attacked the notion of concurrent jurisdiction 
and proclaimed the importance "of a rigid adherence to the simple, 
the received and the fundamental doctrine of the constitution, that 
the power to declare war including the power of judging of the causes 
of war is fully and exclusively vested in the legislature. "308 Again, 
Madison here clearly equates the power to declare war with the power 
to initiate conflict. 
Although Madison's argument against concurrent jurisdiction 
has often been criticized, 309 and Madison himself had limited enthusi-
304 Id. 
305 Letter fromJames Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 13, 1793}, in 15 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 35, at 29. 
306 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 7, 1793}, in 15 MADISON PA-
PERS, supra note 35, at 43. 
307 See James Madison, "Helvidius" Number 1, in 15 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 35, at 
66;James Madison, "Helvidius" Number 2, in 15 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 35, at 80;James 
Madison, "Helvidius" Number 3, in 15 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 35, at 95; Madison, 
"Helvidius" Number 4, supra note 35, at 106; James Madison, "Helvidius" Number 5, in 15 
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 35, at 113. 
308 Madison, "Helvidius" Number 4, supra note 35, at 108. 
309 Professor Corwin, for example, criticized Madison for failing to offer an alternative 
constitutional vision. See EDWIN CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT's CoNTRoL OF FoREIGN RELATIONS 
28 (1917). Professor Schlesinger has stated that Madison's "sketch of the constitutional 
situation did not really explain how, if the executive were to be so constrained, foreign 
affairs were after all to be conducted." ScHLESINGER, supra note 13, at 20. Professor Sofaer 
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asm for the project,310 the letters merit close attention, not just be-
cause they reflect a pro-Congress understanding of the War Powers 
Clause, but because of their discussion of why the Framers gave Con-
gress the power to declare war. As he concluded the fqurth Helvidius 
letter, having articulated and defended his personal understanding of 
the War Powers Clause, Madison sought to strengthen his case by set-
ting forth the concerns which prompted the Framers' decision to as-
sign to Congress the power to declare war: 
In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found than 
in the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the 
legislature, and not to the executive deparunent. Beside the objec-
tion to such a mixture of heterogeneous powers: the trust and the 
temptation would be too great for any one man: not such as nature 
may offer as the prodigy of many centuries, but such as may be ex-
pected in the ordinary successions of magistracy. War is in fact the 
true nurse of executive aggrandizement. In war a physical force is 
to be created, and it is the executive will which is to direct it. In war 
the public treasures are to be unlocked, and it is the executive hand 
which is to dispense them. In war the honors and emoluments of 
office are to be multiplied; and it is the executive patronage under 
which they are to be enjoyed. It is in war, finally, that laurels are to 
be gathered, and it is the executive brow they are to encircle. The 
strongest passions, and most dangerous weaknesses of the human 
breast; ambition, avarice, vanity, the honorable or venial love of 
fame, are all in conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace. 
Hence it has grown into an axiom that the executive is the de-
parunent of power most distinguished by its propensity to war: 
hence it is the practice of all states, in proportion as they are free, to 
disarm the propensity of its infiuence.3 11 
Here, in short compass, Madison pulled together the previously un-
spoken arguments for assigning to Congress the power to declare war. 
The power of his passions, Madison contends, makes the individual an 
unsuitable repository for the power to declare war. Perhaps "the 
prodigy of many centuries" will be able to triumph over these pas-
sions, but the ordinary individual-"such as may be expected in the 
ordinary successions of magistracy"-will not, because the lures are so 
compelling.312 The President simply has too much to gain by leading 
vanced in the Federalist Papers, and that it was not logically coherent, since Madison ac-
knowledged that the Executive could legitimately take some actions that would make war 
more likely. See SoFAER, supra note 14, at 114-15. But see BANNING, supra note 301, at 527 
n.18 (Helvidius "dec::imates the logic of Hamilton's argument that the exe,cutive possesses 
something like a concurrent right with the legislature to determine whether treaty obliga-
tions compel war or peace."). 
310 See BANNING, supra note 301, at 377. 
311 Madison, "Helvidius" Number 4, supra note 35, at 108-09. 
312 Id. at 108. 
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the nation into war and then leading the nation during war. He in-
creases his power in a very tangible way: he "direct[s]" the "physical 
force ... created."313 He increases his control of money: he "dis-
pense[s]" "public treasures."314 He solidifies his power: the opportu-
nities for "executive patronage" are "multiplied."315 What is most 
striking is the conclusion to which Madison builds. The culminating 
passion is "love offame."316 The President will be inclined toward war 
because he will hope to wear the "laurels" of victory.317 As a result, 
"the executive is the department of power most distinguished by its 
propensity to war."s1s 
Implicitly, Madison is also arguing that the legislator will not be 
affected by these passions (or at least not powerfully), and that he will 
therefore act disinterestedly in deciding whether he favors war. His 
passions will not be engaged, in part, because the legislature has only 
limited control of the instruments of war, and, in part, because any 
benefits from war that flow to the legislature will flow to a group, 
rather than to a single individual. Because the legislator does not con-
trol army operations or the actual dispersion of funds or the pa-
tronage generated by war, he will not seek war in order to increase his 
power or the wealth under his direction. The fame of a great triumph 
will not go to the legislator who votes in favor of a successful war, for 
he is but one of many and the fruits of victory will be diminished by 
being shared. Because he is not in control of the military, he will not 
be hailed as the conqueror. The laurels will not be his. 
The Helvidius letters are critical evidence concerning the mean-
ing of the War Powers Clause and the motives which led the Founders 
to give Congress the sole power to initiate war. The letters are roughly 
contemporaneous with the founding. They are the work of an indi-
vidual who played a central role in drafting the War Powers Clause, as 
well as a central role-perhaps the central role-in drafting the Con-
stitution as a whole. The fact that they emerge from a political con-
flict and are partisan documents does not decrease their evidentiary 
significance. Madison, a shrewd politician, was clearly trying to make 
his case against Hamilton by appealing to broadly held notions about 
government and war. In doing so, he laid special stress on the lure of 
fame. 
313 I d. 
314 I d. 
315 I d. 
316 I d. 
317 I d. 
318 Id. at 109. 
1997] THE POWER TO DECLARE WAR 749 
C. Hamilton and the Quasi-War 
Further evidence of the founding generation's belief that an indi-
vidual's desire for glory could recklessly lead a nation to war comes, 
ironically, from the pen of a former President, John Adams who, in 
narrating the history of his administration, discussed his refusal to 
lead the nation into a full-scale war. In 1809, as tensions between the 
United States and Great Britain threatened to end in war, Adams 
wrote a series of letters to the Boston Patriot explaining why he had 
opposed declaring war against France and had instead worked for 
peace during his presidency.319 · 
As previously noted, the undeclared naval war with France-the 
"Quasi-War"-lasted from 1798-1800 and marked the new nation's 
first sustained military conflict with a European power.320 It also 
marked an exception to the "axiom" that Madison enunciated in the 
Helvidius letters. That is, during much of the conflict, Congress took 
a more aggressive stance than the President.321 Adams took great 
pride in this fact, subsequently writing: "I desire no other inscription 
on my gravestone than: 'here lies John Adams, who took upon himself 
the responsibility of the peace with France in the year 1800.' "322 
Those unsympathetic to Adams had a ready explanation for why he 
was not as aggressive as others and the answer had to do with his in-
ability to obtain glory from a war. Noting that "no part of [the Gov-
ernment] was more averse to war than the Executive," Congressman 
Rutledge opined: "[Adams] is no warrior, and, consequently, war has 
no laurels in store for him."323 A very similar explanation for Adams's 
moderate behavior came from a far more sympathetic quarter, his 
vvife. Abigail Adams wrote her friend Mary Cranch: "What benefit 
can war be to him? He has no ambition for military Glory."324 
The champion of the forces pushing for an aggressive stance 
against France was Hamilton.325 He sought not only the creation of a 
revitalized army, but he also engineered a campaign to be designated 
its Commander in Chief.326 When Secretary of State Timothy Picker-
ing proposed naming Hamilton, Adams immediately dismissed the 
possibility of awarding the position to his antagonist. To crush the 
319 See Boston Patriot, supra note 185. 
320 For a general history, see DECONDE, supra note 185. See also supra text accompany-
ing note 180. 
321 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 13, at 21. 
322 Letter fromJohn Adams to James Lloyd (Jan. 1815}, in 10 ADAMS WoRKS, supra 
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described in DECONDE, supra note 185, at 181-222. 
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Hamilton boomlet, Adams sent Washington a letter requesting that he 
serve as Commander in Chief, and then precipitously forwarded 
Washington's name to the Senate as his nominee for the post without 
waiting for the former President's reply.327 Adams's haste angered 
Washington.32B Hamilton, now aware that he would not be Com-
mander in Chief, convinced the offended former President to accept 
the post and then to name him as his second in command. 329 Adams 
balked, insisting that former Secretary of War Henry Knox serve as 
Washington's deputy.33° Washington informed the President that he 
would resign his commission if Hamilton were not awarded the posi-
tion.331 A bitter Adams complied with Washington's demand, after-
wards writing that he had been forced to name "the most restless, 
impatient, artful, indefatigable and unprincipled intriguer in the 
United States, if not the world, to be second in command."332 Per-
haps not coincidentally, at approximately this time, Adams's enthusi-
asm for war with France began to diminish.333 
As he recounted the events of the "Quasi-War'' a decade later, 
Adams made clear that Hamilton had been the principal force behind 
the movement for war. "[S]uch was the influence of Mr. Hamilton in 
Congress, that, without any recommendation from the President, they 
passed a bill to raise an army, not a large one, indeed, but enough to 
overturn the then Federal government."334 And just as Congressman 
Rutledge had contended that Adams was reluctant to go to war be-
cause he was unlikely to win fame, Adams suggested that behind Ham-
ilton's push for war was his desire for personal glory. "The army of 
fifty thousand men," Adams wrote, "appeared to me to be one of the 
wildest extravagances of a knight-errant."335 At another point, Adams 
observed that Hamilton schemed of "ensuring a war with France, and 
enabling him to mount his hobby-horse, the command of an army of 
fifty thousand, ten thousand of them to be horse[s]."336 Peace was 
"[p]ernicious ... to his [Hamilton's] views of ambition and domina-
tion. It extinguished his hopes of being at the head of a victorious 
army of fifty thousand men, without which, he used to say, he had no 
idea of having a head upon his shoulders for four years longer."337 
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According to Adams, "Hamilton hoped [for] . . . an irreconcilable 
breach and a declaration of war. He was disappointed, and lost the 
command of his army."33S In a personal letter written shortly before 
his public letters to the Boston Patriot, Adams drew together many of 
these themes in a sentence, stating: "'Hamilton's hobby horse was 
troops! troops! ... With all of the vanity and timidity of Cicero, all the 
debauchery of Marc Anthony [sic] and all the ambition of Julius Cae-
sar, ... his object was the command of fifty thousand men. "'339 
As his personal letter suggests, Adams's public denunciation of 
Hamilton was consistent with his private thoughts about the man, and 
the public attack was, indeed, more temperate than many of Adams's 
private observations. For example, Adams wrote in a letter to Benja-
min Rush that Hamilton was "a bastard brat of a Scotch pedlar," and 
a "creature ... in a delirium of ambition ... [who] hated every man, 
young or old, who stood in his way or could in any manner eclipse his 
laurels or rival his pretensions."340 Agreeing with Adams's assessment 
that Hamilton was motivated by a desire for "laurels," some historians 
have concluded that in urging war with France, Hamilton was "un-
doubtedly motivated by his ambition and quest for military fame."341 
Even some of Hamilton's friends thought this the case. For example, 
one wrote him that during the Revolutionary War, Hamilton had "de-
voted his talents to ~nhanc[ing] another's glory," and suggested that 
it was now his tum to obtain such glory.342 Indeed, earlier in his life 
Hamilton himself had voiced his longing for war. The first surviving 
letter we have of Hamilton's is a letter that he wrote as a teen-age clerk 
in a St. Croix counting house to Edward Stevens, his childhood 
friend.343 Stevens had departed the island to attend King's College in 
New York City.344 Left behind, Hamilton sadly wrote, "Ned, my Ambi-
tion is prevalent that I contemn the grov'ling and condition of a Clerk 
or the like, to which my Fortune &c. condemns me and would will-
ingly risk my life tho' not my Character to exalt my Station."345 He 
closed, "My Folly makes me ashamd and beg youll Conceal it, yet 
338 Id. at 280. 
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Neddy we have seen such Schemes successfull when the Projector is 
Constant I shall Conclude saying I wish there was a War."346 
Therefore, when in Adams's letters to the Boston Patriot he d~­
scribed Hamilton's campaign against France as "one of the wildest ex-
travagances of a knight-errant," and said that ~he would-be 
Commander-in-Chief sought to use the army as his "hobby-horse," he 
was simply giving public expression to his private beliefs. 347 He may 
even have been correct, at least in part, that Hamilton sought to pro-
voke a war in order to gain personal glory. But the critical point to be 
made here does not concern whether Adams was right or wrong about 
Hamilton. It is, rather, that the world that the Framers inhabited was 
one in which it was possible for a national leader of the first rank to 
believe honestly and to state publicly-not in the heat of the moment, 
but in a considered way after a decade of reflection-that another 
national leader of the first rank sought to precipitate a war simply in 
order to achieve personal glory by leading the nation's troops in 
combat. 
Adams's statements do not directly concern the War Powers 
Clause. The individual whom he saw pushing for war was not the Pres-
ident, and the branch of government over which that individual ex-
erted power was legislative, not executive. But, in a larger way, these 
statements bear directly on our understanding of how the Clause 
came to take the form it did. Like the Helvidius letters, Adams's let-
ters reflect the view that an individual who is in a position to gain 
military glory will be tempted to do so by pushing the nation to war, 
regardless of whether or not war is in the national interest. Adams's 
letters thus provide further evidence that members of the framing 
generation believed that, even in a republic, the desire for glory was so 
profound that the individual who controlled the military could not be 
trusted with the decision whether to go to war. Of course, both Ad-
ams and Madison believed that some could resist that temptation. 
Madison believed that "the prodigy of many centuries" would be able 
to master his passions.34s And, Adams had faith in Adams. But the 
necessity of a rule framed to govern the ordinary case was clear. Alter-
natively, to view the matter from Congressman Rutledge's cynical per-
spective, the nation could not count on always having a president who, 
being "no warrior," would avoid war out of the fear that it had "no 
laurels in store for him."349 
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D. The War of 1812 
Ironically, it was Madison-the individual who had cautioned 
that Presidents' love of fame would lead them to favor war-who 
seiVed as President during the nation's first declared war, the War of 
1812. When it was over, his supporters applauded him for not having 
sacrificed the good of the nation to the pursuit of glory. For example, 
the day he left office, a committee of Washington, D.C. citizens paid 
tribute to him, stating: "Power and national glory, Sir, have often 
before, been acquired by the sword; but rarely without the sacrifice of 
civil or political liberty."350 They lauded his "vigilance" in "re-
strain[ing] the sword within its proper limits, ... wield[ing] an armed 
force of fifty thousand men, aided by an annual disbursement of many 
millions, without infringing a political, civil, or religious right. "351 
But, during the course of the war, Federalist opponents painted a very 
different picture, suggesting that Madison's desire for glory and per-
sonal motives had drawn the nation into a disastrous war. Congress-
man Potter proclaimed Madison "an ambitious military chief'352 and 
suggested that his ambition knew no limits: 
[I]f an Administration like the present, without money, without an 
army, or navy, would plunge this country so unprepared into a war 
... the next thing they would want colonies, as other nations had 
done, and that Bermuda and New Providence would be in our way; 
and we must have Jamaica to get good rum and sugar. And instead 
of this country enjoying peace, which is above all things the most 
desirable, we should be involved like other nations in perpetual 
war.353 
Congressman Miller called the war a "war of conquest" and suggested 
that President Madison had started it in the hope of quieting opposi-
tion: "[A] weak and wicked administration ... finding the confidence 
of the people withdrawn, and their power about to pass into other 
hands, have nothing to do but to declare war, and instantly all opposi-
tion must cease .... "354 Senator Goldsborough agreed. He obseiVed 
that "[t]he President himself is the father and patron of this war,"355 
and suggested that the war had been declared to secure support for 
the Administration. "Thus," he said, "the tottering edifice is saved 
from the tempest of public opinion .... "356 Congressmen Daniel 
350 Address of James Blake, Chair of a Committee of Washington, D.C. Citizens, to 
James Madison (Mar. 4, ~817), quoted in DREW R McCoY, THE LAsr OF THE FATHERS: jAM~:.<> 
MADISON AND THE REPUBLICAN LEGACY 12 (1989). 
351 Id. (alteration in original). 
352 Al'INALS OF CoNG., 12th Cong., 2d Sess. 449 (Dec, 1812). 
353 Id. at 448-49. 
354 ANNALS OF CoNG., 13th Cong., 1st Sess. 956 Qan. 1814). 
355 Id. at 579. · 
356 Id. at 580. 
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Webster attacked the war as one begun to obtain "the harvest of great-
ness and glory. "357 Congressman Law similarly attacked the war as 
one fought "for glory,"358 adding that he could not "consent to involve 
the country in carnage, distress and ruin, for that phantom."359 Con-
gressman Brigham invoked the individual who many Americans of the 
day would have offered as the principal example of a man whose pur-
suit of greatness and glory had come at tragic cost: "[T]here is no 
right [in Canada] but a Napoleon right, and that right is power, and 
not that which reason approves."36o 
Early in the war, the link between the desire for glory and the 
decision to go to war received its fullest exploration in a speech by 
Massachusetts Congressmen Josiah Quincy, a leading Federalist and 
future President of Harvard University.361 Quincy argued that the mo-
tivation for war lay in personal interest, specifically "the personal or 
local ambition of the members of the American Cabinet."362 "Who-
ever plants the American standard on the walls of Quebec," he stated, 
"conquers it for himself, and not for the people of the United 
States."363 He ascribed to President Madison and Secretary of State 
James Monroe ambitions that had a monarchical cast: 
To secure the succession, and keep it in the destined line, has been, 
is, and will continue to be, the main object of the policy of these 
men [Madison and his Secretary of State James Monroe]. This is 
the point on which the projects of the Cabinet, for the three years 
past, have been brought to bear-that James the First Uames 
Madison] should be made to continue four years longer. And this is 
the point on which the projects of the Cabinet will be brought to 
bear for the three years to come-that James the Second Uames 
Monroe] shall be made to succeed, according to the fundamental 
rescripts of the Monticellian dynasty.364 
The desire to remain in power was joined with a desire for a kind of 
glory that Quincy pronounced ignoble, and, like Brigham, he invoked 
the example of Napoleon. 
What glory [will victory bring]? Is it the glory of the tiger which lifts 
his jaws, all foul and bloody, from the bowels of his victim, and roars 
for his companions of the wood to come and witness his prowess 
and his spoils? Such is the glory of Ginghis Khan, and of Bonaparte. 
357 Id. at 942. 
358 ANNAlS oF CoNG., 12th Cong., 2d Sess. 540 (Jan. 1813). 
359 Jd. 
360 Id. at 514. For a discussion of Napoleon, his desire for greamess, and popular 
perceptions, see BRAUDY, supra note 224, at 408-16. 
361 For a discussion of Congressman Quincy and the prominence of this speech, see 
DoNALD R. HicKEY, THE WAR OF 1812, at 109 (1989). 
362 ANNAlS OF CoNG., 12th Cong., 2d Sess. 561 (Jan. 1813). 
363 Id. at 549. 
364 Id. at 564. 
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Be such glory far, very far, from my country. Never, never may it be 
accursed with such fame.365 
755 
"A giant obtain[s] glory by crushing a pigmy!" Quincy exclaimed.366 
"That giant must have a pigmy's spirit who could reap, or hope, glory 
from such an achievement."367 He called on the nation to pursue in-
stead a different kind of fame: 
"Fame is no plant that grows on mortal soil, 
Nor in the glistering foil 
Set off to the world, nor in broad rumor lies, 
But lives and spreads aloft, by those pure eyes, 
And perfect witness of alljudging Jove, 
As he pronounces lastly on each deed." 
May such fame as this be my country's meed!36S 
In January 1814, one year after Quincy's speech, the American 
offensive in Canada had proven a failure, and it was the British who 
had taken the offensive.369 In that month, Congressman Miller gave a 
speech that, like Quincy's, highlighted the relationship between war 
and the desire for glory, although the warning about the relationship 
now came from a different perspective. Miller suggested that Madison 
had started the war in order to achieve glory, mistakenly believing that 
the Canadians would surrender rather than fight: "The American 
commander was to gain his laurels, with 'rapier unstained, and sword 
unhacked,' and in honor of his bloodless victory, was to have an 'ova-
tion' decreed him."370 This was an enormous miscalculation. The 
navy had won victories, but Madison could not properly take credit for 
them: "The Administration ought not to rob the individuals con-
cerned of their well-earned laurels."371 Discussing Commander 
Perry's naval triumphs, Miller observed: "[T]here is no glory without 
danger-and the fame acquired may be in proportion to the disparity 
of force. The Administration, however, is not justified in omitting to 
place our naval force on Lake Erie on a more respectable footing 
.... "372 But the Executive could fairly be assigned responsibility for 
what the army had done. Miller sarcastically stated: "1 deny this Ad-
ministration any credit on account of the Navy; but I am content they 
should be decorated with all the laurels their army has gained. It is 
their army; let them monopolize its glory."373 Mter listing a series of 
365 Id. at 548. 
366 Id. at 547. 
367 !d. 
368 Id. at 548. 
369 See HICKEY, supra note 361, at 158. 
370 ANNALS OF CoNG., 13th Cong., 1st Sess. 965 (Jan. 1814). 
371 Id. at 971. 
372 Id. at 971-72. 
373 Id. at 963. 
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disasters, Miller highlighted one incident involving the army through 
which a kind of fame had been won: "Your commanding officer 
[General McClure] had determined to cross the Niagara, and yet with 
cold-blooded insensibility he burnt Newark, 'the loveliest Village of the 
plain.' If General McClure panted for immortality he has obtained it; 
so did the miscreant who fired the temple of Ephesus."374 McClure 
was thus the modem Herostratus, the man who had burned the tem-
ple of Ephesus; each had destroyed something beautiful to be 
remembered forever.375 And that was Madison's fame as well, for hav-
ing led the nation to war. He could "monopol~ze" the fame of a 
Herostratus. 
IV 
CuRRENT SIGNIFICANCE 
To this point, this Article has principally been an attempt at re-
covery-at unearthing a forgotten concern. It has shown that the 
Founders and political leaders of the early republic feared that the 
lure of fame would lead individuals, in general, and Presidents, in par-
ticular, to favor war, even when it was not in the national interest. The 
Article has argued that, because of this fear, the Founders gave Con-
gress alone the power to start war. This Part explores the significance 
of this concern about farrie to modem interpretations of the War Pow-
ers Clause, both from originalist and nonoriginalist perspectives. 
A. Traditional Originalist 
The greatest weakness of the pro-Congress originalist reading of 
the War Powers Clause is that pro-Congress scholars have been unable 
to offer an explanation for why the Founders thought that the power 
to initiate conflict should be exclusively vested in Congress. Pro-Exec-
utive scholars, in contrast, have been able to offer a range of reasons 
why the Founders would have likely given this power to the Execu-
tive.376 In particular, precedent and the Founders' views on the 
strengths of the President suggest that the Founders would have given 
the President the power to start wars.377 Moreover, the terms used in 
the Constitution-declare war, letters of marque and reprisal-were 
terms with a fixed and narrow meaning in international law. 378 As a 
result of this evidence, Pro-Executive scholars argue that the warmak-
ing power is vested in the President, despite relevant statements from 
374 Id. at 972. 
375 For a discussion of Herostratus and the use of his actions as a cautionary tale, see 
supra text accompanying notes 231-33. 
376 See supra text accompanying notes 69-81. 
377 See supra text accompanying notes 152-57. 
378 See supra text accompanying notes 70-79. 
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the founding generation indicating that Congress alone had the 
power to initiate conflict. 
By highlighting the Founders' concern with the lure of military 
fame, this Article has offered a reason why the Founders would have 
taken the power to start war away from the Presidebt. Madison's 
Helvidius letters make the point explicitly: "[T]he question of war" is 
confided to the legislature because "[i] t is in war ... that laurels are to 
be gathered, and it is the executive brow they are to encircle."379 The 
Helvidius letters thus clarify both that Madison understood Congress 
alone as having the power to start war, and that, because of his con-
cern with fame, he thought this allocation of power appropriate. 
Moreover, additional evidence offered in the previous section indi-
cates that the concern about the lure of military fame was widely 
shared. Given such concern, the Founders would have wanted to give 
Congress alone the power to start war. Thus, this Article has served to 
remedy the principal weakness in the pro-Congress argument. It dra-
matically strengthens the position that the War Powers Clause-in giv-
ing Congress the power to declare war and issue letters of marque and 
reprisal-was not intended to be read by reference to the usages of 
international law. Rather, what the Founders intended was to give 
Congress the power to decide in all instances, except those of sudden 
attacks, whether the United States should go to war. 
The evidence presented above also suggests that the dominant 
original understanding was that the President could not veto declara-
tions of war. S.cholars have previously argued on textual grounds that 
the President lacks the veto power, but no one has made that argu-
ment on originalist grounds. 380 The failure to do so is understandable 
because the conceptions of the War Powers Clause previously ad-
vanced by both pro-Executive and pro-Congress scholars indicate that 
the Founders would have wanted to give the President a veto. 
Whether the original understanding was that the President should be 
at the center of decisions on war and peace-as pro-Executive schol-
ars maintain-or that as many barriers as possible to war should be 
imposed-as pro-Congress scholars maintain-presumably both ends 
are advanced by giving the President a veto.381 But if the President's 
desire for military fame will consistently push him towards war, then a 
veto is pointless because it will not be exercised. Moreover, because 
the President's decisionmaking in this area will be hopelessly cor-
rupted by self.interest, it is reasonable to wholly exclude him from the 
warmaking process. There is, then, a simple reason why the Founders 
379 Madison, "Helvidius" Number 4, supra note 35, at 108. 
380 See supra text accompanying notes 189-99. 
381 See supra text accompanying notes 186-200. 
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consistently described the decision to declare war as exclusively a legis-
lative decision: they understood it to be an exclusively legislative decision. 
For the traditional originalist, then, the inquiry about the mean-
ing of the War Powers Clause is at an end. Traditional originalists 
believe that judges should construe constitutional text as it was under-
stood at the time of its adoption. The leading champion of this ap-
proach-although he has forsaken it in the war powers area-is 
Robert Bork, and he has described it in the following fashion: "What 
is the meaning of a rule that judges should not change?, . It is the 
meaning understood at the time of the law's enactment."382 But there 
is another school of originalism, the translation school. The transla-
tor seeks to identify the ends that the Constitution's Framers sought to 
advance, and then interprets the Constitution in the way that best ad-
vances those ends in today~s.world, while altering the original reading 
as little as possible.383 Having established the concrete understanding 
of the founding generation, the translator must still answer a thresh-
old question: Has the world changed in such a way so that the con-
crete understanding of the constitutional text should change?384 In 
other words, the Founders gave Congress, rather than the Executive, 
the power to decide whether to start wars because they wanted the 
warmaking decision to be disinterested, and they feared that Presi-
dents would lead the nation into war in order to achieve a place in 
history. The translator must answer whether it continues to be true 
that the Executive is the branch of government most likely to have 
self-interested reasons to wage war. 
There are, of course, nonoriginalist approaches to constitutional 
law, although it is rare for constitutional scholars to ignore history 
wholly.385 In the war powers area, the writings that have accorded the 
least weight to the original understanding have been, as previously 
noted, the work of pro-Executive scholars, and the focus of this schol-
arship has been on evolving constitutional structure and pragmatic 
concerns. Scholars such as Bork, Rostow, and W. Michael Reisman 
382 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 144 (1990). 
383 The translation model has been developed by Professor Lawrence Lessig. See Law-
rence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1165 (1993); Lawrence Lessig, Translat-
ing Federalism: United States v Lopez, 1995 SuP. CT. REv. 125; Lawrence Lessig, 
Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REv. 395 (1995). For an 
application of Lessig's model, see Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 5, at 855-87. 
384 See Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 383, at 1263; Treanor, Takings Clause, 
supra note 5, at 856-57. 
385 Ronald Dworkin, for example, is the paradigmatic example of a constitutional phi-
losopher who advances a moral reading of the document, but nonetheless draws on history 
and tradition as guides to constitutional decisionmaking through his concept of "fit." See 
RONALD DwoRKIN, FREEDOM's LAw: THE MoRAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
3-18 (1996); RoNALD DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 227-28 (1986). For further discussion of the 
role of history in constitutional interpretation, even among nonoriginalists, see Flaherty, 
supra note 31, at 1745-47. 
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have argued that because the President can move more rapidly, force-
fully, and secretly than Congress, he should have the power to start 
war. 386 If the thesis of this Article is to have any siguificance for the 
nonoriginalist, it must be shown, not that the Framers feared that the 
President would lead the nation into war in order to achieve fame, but 
that such concern is a pressing one today. 
In short, although their constitutional theories are different, both 
the translator and the nonoriginalist are concerned with the relation-
ship between the Founders' insights and modem circumstance. This 
topic is the subject of the next section. 
B. Fame, the Presidency, and War 
Unlike the Founders, we no longer tend to perceive the desire to 
be remembered by history as a fundamental human drive. Writing in 
1840, Tocqueville precisely captured the decline in the interest in 
fame in its traditional sense and offered a cogent explanation for that 
decline. He observed that one of the 
first thing[s] that strikes a traveler in the United States is ... the 
rarity oflofty ambition to be observed in the midst of the universally 
ambitious stir of society. No Americans are devoid of a yearning 
desire to rise, but hardly any appear to entertain hopes of great 
magnitude or to pursue very lofty aims. 387 
Tocqueville noted that this was a relatively recent phenomenon and 
that Americans of the revolutionary era had harbored such ambitions: 
All revolutions enlarge the ambition of men .... When the for-
mer barriers that kept back the multitude from fame and power are 
suddenly thrown down, a violent and universal movement takes 
place towards that eminence so long coveted and at length to be 
enjoyed .... 
Ambition is therefore always extremeiy great as long as a demo-
cratic revolution lasts, and it will remain so for some time after the 
revolution is consummated.388 
According to Tocqueville, the establishment of a constitutional and 
social order had led people to lower their goals: 
A democratic nation, arrived at this permanent and regular 
state of things, will present a very different spectacle from that 
which I have just described, and we may readily conclude that if 
ambition becomes great while the conditions of society are growing 
equal, it loses that quality when they have grown so. 
386 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
387 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 243 (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred 
A. Knopf 1945) (1840). 
388 ld. at 243-44. 
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I believe that ambitious men in democracies are less engrossed 
than any others with the interests and the judgment of posterity; the 
present moment alone engages and absorbs them. They are more 
apt to complete a number of undertakings with rapidity than to 
raise lasting monuments of their achievements, and they care much 
more for success than for fame.3B9 
In accordance with Tocqueville's insight, soon after the founding 
many Americans came to believe that "there was no more fame to be 
won."39° The young John Quincy Adams, for example, declared: 
"The field is extensive; it is fruitful ... but the copious treasures of its 
fragrance have already been gathered by the hands of genius; and 
there now remains for the gleaning of mental indigence, nought but 
the thinly scattered sweets which have escaped the vigilance of their 
industry."391 The passing of the Founders' world can be marked, in 
part, by a linguistic change that may explain why their concerns about 
fame have been obscured. When the Founders spoke of fame, they 
meant a desire to leave a mark on history for having done great 
things; for us, to be famous is simply to be widely-known. 392 
This might suggest that the Framers' fear that a President's desire 
for fame or glory would lead him to initiate wars was a time-bound 
one. The argument against the original understanding would thus be 
that, despite grounds for fearing that a President's desire for glory 
would make him favor war in 1789 or in 1812, we no longer live in a 
society where individuals are obsessed with their place in history. Ac-
cordingly, the Framers' distrust of a President with t~?-e power to start 
war no longer has any relevance, and, to the extent that constitutional 
law can move beyond a rigid application of the original understand-
ing, it should do so in this case. Moreover, we need not fear that 
Presidents will lead the nation into war in order to achieve fame as we 
now understand the word; Presidents are already as "famous" as they 
can be. 
However, the fact that our societal norms and concerns have 
changed does not necessarily mean that Presidents will behave differ-
ently than the Founders predicted. Systematic analysis of the contin-
uing accuracy of the Framers' view is beyond the scope of this Article. 
There is, however, good evidence that, despite cultural changes, they 
were right about the way in which a desire for a place in history would 
affect the occupants of the Executive office. 
389 
390 
391 
392 
Id. at 24447. 
LIENESCH, supra note 224, at 181. 
Id. (quoting john Quincy Adams, An Oration Pronouncedjuly 4, 1793). 
See ADAIR, supra note 32, at 8-13. 
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In describing his life's goals, Woodrow Wilson wrote that he had 
"a longing to do immortal work."393 He has not been alone in his 
desire for immortality. A concern with how they would be 
remembered has driven many Presidents. It is significant that Adair 
offers one example of a modern American who had a passion for fame 
in the eighteenth century sense. Urging a revival of the largely lost 
tradition, Adair concluded his essay: 
Who. can doubt that this obsessive concern with the judgment of 
posterity was not one of the ingredients that made the late John 
Kennedy something more than just another Irish politician from 
Boston. Who can doubt that it was his concern with his fame-his 
concern with thejudgmentofposterity-thatmade him respond, as 
Arthur Schlesinger has told us, to those lovely lines of Stephen 
Spender's poem: 
I think continually of those who are truly great ... 
The names of those who in their lives fought for life, 
Who wore at their hearts the fire's center. 
Born of the sun they travelled a short while towards the 
sun, 
And left the vivid air signed with their honor.394 
One need not agree with Adair's view that Kennedy "respond[ed] to 
Spender's poem" to accept the underlying point that Kennedy was 
obsessed with history's judgment. Richard Reeves's recent biography 
of Kennedy provides further evidence of this concern: 
There was no question in Kennedy's mind, and little argnment 
from anyone else, that the struggle with communism would be the 
focus of the history of his times. As 1961 ended, he had begnn an 
address to historians meeting in Washington by quoting Churchill's 
prediction that history would be kind to his role in World War II: 
"Because I intend to write it!" 
And Kennedy intended to do the same, with the help of Soren-
sen and Schlesinger. He had invited one of the historians, David 
Donald of Princeton, an expert on Abraham Lincoln, to the White 
House and asked him: "How do you go down in the history books 
as a great president?"395 
393 JOHN MORTON BLUM, WOODROW WILSON AND THE POLITICS OF MORALI"IY 19 (1956) 
(quoting Wilson). 
394 ADAIR, supra note 32, at 26. 
395 RicHARD REEvEs, PRESIDENT KENNEDY: PROFILE OF POWER 278 (1993). Professor 
Donald, in recounting this meeting with Kennedy in the preface of his Lincoln biography, 
highlighted President Kennedy's concern about being regarded badly by historians: 
He [Kennedy] voiced his dissatisfaction with the glib way the historians had 
rated some of his predecessors as "Below Average" and marked a few as 
"Failures." Thinking, no doubt, of how his own administration would look 
in the backward glance of history, he resented the whole process. With real 
feeling he said, "No one has a right to grade a President-not even poor 
James Buchanan-who has not sat in his chair, examined the mail and in-
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Ironically, at almost the exact time that Tocqueville was writing, 
one American who would later make his mark on history gave evi-
dence that, despite the age in which he lived, he had dreams of the 
greatest glory. In 1838, Abraham Lincoln, a young state legislator, 
gave a speech to the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois. He 
saluted the Founders and the fame they had won. According to Lin-
coln, the Founders had desired to prove 
the capability of a p·eople to govern themselves. If they succeeded, 
they were to be immortalized; their names were to be transferred to 
counties and cities, and rivers and mountains; and to be revered 
and sung, and toasted through all time. If they failed, they were to 
be called knaves and fools, and fanatics for a fleeting hour; then to 
sink and be forgotten. They succeeded. The experiment is success-
ful; and thousands have won their deathless names in making it 
so.396 
Echoing Adams, Lincoln wrote that it seemed that "[t]his field of 
glory is harvested, and the crop is already appropriated."397 But, un-
like Adams, he did not accept the view that glory was no longer attain-
able: "[N]ew reapers will arise, and they, too, will seek a field."398 He 
continued: 
Towering genius disdains a beaten path. It seeks regions hitherto 
unexplored. It sees no distinction in adding story to story, upon the 
monuments of fame, erected to the memory of others. It denies 
that it is glory enough to serve under any chief. It scorns to tread in 
the footsteps of any predecessor, however illustrious. It thirsts and 
bums for distinction; and, if possible, it will have it, whether at the 
expense of emancipating slaves, or enslaving freemen.399 
formation that came across his desk, and learned why he made his 
decisions." 
DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 13 (1995). 
396 Abraham Lincoln, Address before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois 
Uan. 27, 1838), in 1 THE CoLLECTED WoRKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 108, 113 (Roy P. Basler 
ed., 1953) (emphasis omitted). 
397 /d. 
398 /d. (emphasis omitted). 
399 /d. at 114 (emphasis omitted). This speech has inspired extensive scholarly com-
mentary since Edmund Wilson first focused attention on it. See EDMUND WILSON, PATRI-
OTIC GoRE: STUDIES IN THE LITERATURE OF THE AMERICAN CiVIL WAR 106-08 (1962) 
(arguing that Lincoln envisioned himself as the individual who threatened the constitu-
tional order). In particular, Lincoln psychobiographers have argued that the speech offers 
a key to understanding the former President. See DWIGHT G. ANDERSON, ABRAHAM LIN-
COLN; THE QUEST FOR IMMORTALITY 68-78 (1982); GEORGE B. FORGIE, PATRICIDE IN THE 
HOUSE DIVIDED: A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF LINCOLN AND HIS AGE 83-86, 249-70 
(1979); CHARLES B. STROZIER, LINCOLN's QuEST FOR UNION: Punuc AND PRIVATE MEANINGs 
61 (1982). Garry Wills has recently criticized the psychobiographers' argument that the 
speech reflects "hostility tO 'the :fathers.' " GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETIYSBURG: THE 
WoRDs THAT REMADE AMERICA 79 (1992). My claim here, however, is not that Lincoln was 
hostile to the Founders. Rather, it is that he envied the fume they had achieved and hoped 
to achieve a similar immortality. My interpretation accords with, and was influenced by, 
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Moreover, it is not simply that the presidency attracts those inter-
ested in establishing an important historical reputation. Instead, once 
attained, the presidency-and all of its trappings-strengthen its oc-
cupants' concern for their place in history. As scholar Forrest McDon-
ald observed: 
[W]hat presidents do in office, or try to do, is powerfully influenced 
by a unique conception of history. The president lives in a museum 
of the history of the presidency. When walking along the halls of 
the White House, the president is constantly reminded that Jeffer-
son walked the same halls as he waited for news of negotiations with 
Napoleon, that Lincoln walked them when waiting for news of An-
tietam. When dining, the president never entirely escapes the reali-
zation that he is using the same silver that Madison and both 
Roosevelts used. The president understands that he is a member of 
a mystical fraternity, representing an unbroken chain of history and 
mythology, and knows that far into the.future presidents will be 
aware that he was a link in that chain, and cannot avoid wondering 
what his place will be in their memory and in the nation's 
memory.400 
The topic of how Presidents confront, and try to surpass, the leg-
acy of their predecessors is an understudied one. William 
Leuchtenberg, the author of In the Shadow ofFDR,401 observed in 1983 
that no previous book or article had focused on "the influence of a 
head of state on those who succeeded him."402 Leuchtenberg's study 
suggests how powerfully a predecessor's legacy can haunt Presidents. 
Leuchtenberg wrote: 
[T]he men who succeeded him [FDR] found one question ines-
capable: How did they measure up to FDR? They were expected to 
tread in the rows that he had furrowed, even, like those who sought 
a sign of grace from a Chinese emperor, to exhibit the quality of 
hsiao, of filial piety. Little wonder that they sometimes felt much 
like the Athenian who voted to exile Aristides because he had wea-
ried of hearing him called "the Just."403 
Professor David Donald's reading of the speech. According to Donald, Lincoln's speech 
reflected "his thirst for distinction," and it accorded with statements that he had made 
privately to his close friend joshua Speed. See DoNALD, supra note 395, at 81. "To this one 
intimate friend," Donald writes, "Lincoln confessed his ambition 'to link his name with 
something that would redound to the interest of his fellow man,' and in his darker moods 
he lamented 'that he had done nothing to make any human being remember that he had 
lived.'" Id. (quoting Letter from joshua Speed to William H. Herndon, Feb. 1866). For 
further discussion of the speech, see William Michael Treanor, Learning from Lincoln, 65 
FoRDHAM L. REv. (forthcoming 1997). 
400 FoRREST McDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 466-67 (1994). 
401 WILUAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, IN THE SHADOW OF FDR: FROM HARRY TRUMAN TO RON-
ALD REAGAN (rev. ed. 1989). 
402 Id. at 265. The first edition of Leuchtenburg's book was published in 1983. 
403 Id. at xi. 
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There is also evidence that suggests that Presidents are well aware of 
the link between leading a nation to military triumph and historical 
immortality and, conversely, of the link between military disaster and 
infamy. The fear of the reputational consequences of military disaster 
is evidenced by what White House Butler Alonzo Fields reports was 
FDR's reaction to first hearing the news of Pearl Harbor. According 
to Fields, he put his head in his hands and said, "My God, .my God, 
how did it happen? How did it happen? Now I'll go down in history 
disgraced."404 Lyndon Johnson's explanation for why he would not 
end the war in Vietnam manifests a similar fear. He declared, "I will 
not be the first President to lose a war."4os 
On the other hand, perhaps because of his heightened sensitivity 
to the desire for fame, Lincoln saw in Polk's support for war with Mex-
ico a desire for "military glory-that attractive rainbow, that rises in 
showers of blood-that serpent's eye, that charms to destroy."406 Nu-
merous individuals have suggested similar links between modem pres-
idents' desire for glory or concern with their place in history and war-
like foreign policy. Historian Alan Brinkley has observed of Theodore 
Roosevelt: 
Theodore Roosevelt complained frequently that his times had de-
nied him the greatness to which he aspired and of which he consid-
ered himself capable. "A man has to take advantage of his 
opportunities," he said in 1910 after leaving office, "but the oppor-
tunities have to come. If there is not the war, you don't get the 
great general; if there is not the great occasion, you don't get the 
great statesman; if Lincoln had lived in times of peace, no one 
would know his name now." The great disappointment of 
Roosevelt's life was that World War I came after he had left office, 
that, as he saw it, Woodrow Wilson and not he had the real opportu-
nity for greatness. 407 
The previously quoted excerpt from biographer Richard Reeves's 
book on john Kennedy suggests that Kennedy recognized Churchill's 
commanding place in history and wanted to win a parallel place for 
404 Interview with Alonzo Fields, White House Butler, American Experience: FDR (PBS 
television broadcast, Oct. 12, 1994) Uoumal Graphics Transcripts #702, on file with au-
thor). It should be noted that other accounts of Roosevelt's reaction to the bombing of 
Pearl Harbor are different. For example, relying on Sumner Welles's and Eleanor 
Roosevelt's statements, historian Doris Keams Goodwin describes Roosevelt's "imperturba-
ble demeanor." Dorus KEARNs GoODWlN, No ORDINARY TIME: FRANKLIN AND ELEANOR 
RoosEVELT: THE HoME FRONT IN WoRLD WAR II 289 (1994). 
405 James Reston, Private Behavior, Public Responsibility, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1987, at 
A27. 
406 Abraham Lincoln, Speech in United States House of Representatives: The War 
with Mexico Uan. 12, 1848), in 1 THE CoLLEGrED WoRKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 
396, at 439. For an analysis of this passage, see DoNALD, supra note 395, at 124. 
407 Alan Brinkley, The 43% President, N.Y. TIMES, july 4, 1993, § 6, at 22. 
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himself through the struggle with communism.408 In describing the 
path to Vietnam, historian and Johnson presidential aide Eric 
Goldman wrote: 
Intertwined with all aspects of his foreign policy was the President's 
ambition. Much as Uohnson] wished that international affairs 
could be de-emphasized, he was too seasoned a political leader not 
to know that they were certain to play an important part in the over-
all judgment of his Administration. He was determined that when 
he did have to deal with them, he would do so with effectiveness 
and splash. Lyndon Johnson was going to be a great President, a 
very great Preside~t, in all ways.409 
Leuchtenburg's account draws upon and parallels Goldman's ac-
count. Johnson, he writes: 
was not satisfied to go down in the history books merely as a success-
ful president in the Roosevelt tradition. He aimed instead to be 
"the greatest of them all, the whole bunch of them." And to be the 
greatest president in history, he needed not just to match 
Roosevelt's performance but to surpass it.410 
According to Leuchtenburg, this determination drove Johnson to 
Vietnam and to disaster: "In his determination to outdo Roosevelt, 
U ohnson] carried everything to excess-the overladen apparatus of 
the Great Society; the insistence on having both guns and butter, 
which had calamitous inflationary repercussions; and, most of all, the 
body counts and the napalm and the saturation bombing."411 Doris 
Kearns Goodwin J?Uts the matter succinctly: 
Lyndon Johnson had _wanted to surpass Franklin Roosevelt; and 
Roosevelt, after all, had not only won the reforms Johnson envied, 
he had also waged a war. But there was a critical difference: 
Roosevelt did not attempt the New Deal and World War IT at the 
same time. Only Johnson among the Presidents sought to be simul-
taneously first in peace and first in war; and even Johnson was 
bound to fail.412 
The 1970 Senate Foreigu Relations Committee report calling for 
the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution also reflected the view 
that concern for their place in history led Presidents to favor war.413 
408 See REEVES, supra note 395, at 278. See also MICHAEL S. SHERRY, IN THE SHADOW OF 
WAR, THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE 1930s, at 244 (1995) (asserting that Kennedy hoped 
his presidency would witness a "climax" to history "yield[ing] winners and losers."); supra 
text accompanying note 395. 
409 ERIC F. GOLDMAN, THE TRAGEDY OF LYNDON jOHNSON 384 (1969). 
410 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 401, at 142 (quoting Goldman, supra note 409, at 20). 
411 Id. at 160. 
412 DORIS KEARNS, LYNDON jOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 285 (1976). 
413 See COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TERMINATION OF MIDDLE EAsT AND SOUTH-
EAST AsiA REsoLUTIONs, S. REP. No. 91-834, at 6-8 (1970). 
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As background for its recommendation, the Committee analyzed the 
rise of presidential power in the war powers area in the years following 
the Second World War. It offered one explanation for why Presidents 
had led the nation into war without securing congressional approval. 
That explanation was the Presidents' desire for greatness-"[the] no-
tion that great Presidents are those who act effectively to strengthen 
the office of the Presidency as distinguished from strengthening the 
constitutional system as a whole."414 
Richard Nixon's writings and his personal statements reveal that 
he considered military triumphs and, more generally, foreign policy 
triumphs, as the key to greatness. War was, for Nixon, the truest cruci-
ble. He· wrote: "It is a tragic reality that war, the most destructive 
activity of man, also calls forth his highest nature and greatest quali-
ties."415 According to Nixon, through "[h]is brilliant leadership in 
World War 11,"416 Winston Churchill had become the greatest leader 
of the modem era. Churchill was " 'a mythical hero who belongs to 
legend as much as to reality, the largest human being of our time.' "417 
More prosaically, Nixon told his aide Monica Crowley shortly before 
he died that President Clinton should focus on foreigu affairs because 
"'history will not remember him for anything he does domestically. 
The economy will recover; it's all short-term and, let's face it, very 
boring.'"4ts 
William Crowe, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggested that 
President Bush's concern with his place in history was part of the rea-
son why he initiated the Gulf War: "' [T] o be a great president you 
have to have a war. All the great presidents have had their wars.'"41 9 
Even more recently, it has been suggested that regard for "his place in 
history'' influenced President Clinton to be militarily aggressive in 
Bosnia.420 
414 Id. at 8. The Committee called on future Presidents to embrace, instead, the view 
of presidential greamess offered by the historian Thomas Bailey in his book Presidential 
Greatness: 
"The bare fact that a President was a strong one, or a domineering one, 
does not necessarily mean that he was a great one or even a good one. The 
crucial questions arise: Was he strong in the right direction? Was he a dig-
nified, fair, constitutional ruler, serving the ends of democracy in a demo-
cratic and ethical manner?" 
Id. (quoting THoMAS A BAILEY, PRESIDENTIAL GREATNESS 227 (1966)). 
415 RiCHARD NIXON, IN THE ARENA: A MEMOIR OF VICTORY, DEFEAT AND RENEWAL 352 
(1990). 
4l6 Id. at 27. 
417 Id. (quoting with approval Isaiah Berlin). 
418 Christopher Buckley, Final judgments, N.Y. TIMF.S, Aug. 25, 1996, § 7, at 5 (reviewing 
MONICA CROWLEY, NIXON OFF THE REcoRD (1996) (quoting Nixon statement recorded in 
Crowley book)). 
419 BoB WooDWARD, THE COMMANDERS 6 (1991) (quoting William Crane). 
420 See R.W. Apple, Jr., Why the Choice of '96 Will Remain a Bafflement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
18, 1996, § 4, at 1. It should be noted that, just as Presidents are concerned with their 
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If Presidents equate military victories with historical greatness, 
they are correct-or, at least, their views are in accord ·with what his-
torians regard as greatness. Admiral Crowe's observation about great 
Presidents is remarkably accurate. Washington, Lincoln, and Franklin 
Roosevelt-the trio that historians have consistently rated as our three 
greatest presidents421-each led the nation to victory in war, Lincoln 
and Roosevelt as Presidents, and Washington as Commander in Chief 
at a time when there was no President. The link between fame and 
war is not limited to this group. Of the four Presidents who are typi-
cally ranked next on the lists of presidential greatness-Jefferson, 
Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, and Truman-two led the nation in a 
m~or war, Wilson during World War I, and Truman during World 
War II and the Korean War.422 
In the most detailed study on the topic of why historians view 
particular Presidents as great, Dean Keith Simonton used a regression 
analysis to examine the various presidential rankings compiled by his-
torians. 423 He explored how over 200 variables-including factors 
such as number of bills signed, number of bills vetoed, percentage of 
place in history, so too have they been concerned with learning the lessons of history, 
although they have not always drawn the lessons scholars might think appropriate. In 
much of the post-World War II era, Presidents have concluded that the Jesson to be drawn 
from history was the need for toughness in dealing with foreign nations. See ERNEST R. 
MA.v, "LESSONS" OF THE PAST: THE USE AND MISUSE OF HISTORY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
10, 57, 113-14 (1973). In the wake of the Vietnam War, the lessons of past wars have been 
understood differently by different Presidents. Compare SHERRY, supra note 408, at 344-45 
(asserting that Carter opposed militarization in part because of nation's experience in Viet-
nam), with id. at 392-93 (asserting that Reagan's "memories and experience of World War 
II and the War" encouraged his support for militarization). 
421 Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. conducted the first such poli of historians in 1948. See Ar-
thur M. Schlesinger, What Makes a President Great? Or a Failure? The Verdict of History Provides 
Some A1lSWer.s, LiFE, Nov. 1, 1948, at 66 (ranking Lincoln, Washington, and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt as the three greatest Presidents). Eight subsequent polis have similarly con-
cluded that Lincoln, Washington, and Franklin D. Roosevelt were our three greatest Presi-
dents. And each of the polis has ranked Lincoln the "greatest" of the three. See, e.g., 
Robert K. Murray & Tim H. Blessing, The Presidential Peiformance Study: A Progress Report,]. 
AM. HJST. 535, 542 (1983) (ranking Lincoln, Washington, and Franklin D. Roosevelt as the 
greatest Presidents); Steve Neal, Putting the Presidents in Their Place: Longtime Favorites Top the 
List, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Nov. 19, 1995, at 30 (same); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Our Presidents: A 
Ranking by 75 Historians, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1996, §6 (Magazine), at 12 (same); Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., The Ultimate Approval Rating,· N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 15, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at 
46 (same). The ranking lists produced by these surveys, except for the two most recent, 
are presented in Jack E. Holmes & Robert E. Elder, Jr., Our Best and Wor.st Presidents: Some 
Possihk Reasons for Perceived Peiformance, 19 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 529 ( 1989). 
422 On designation of this group, see DEAN KEITH SIMONTON, WHY PRESIDENTS Suc 
CEED: A POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF LEADERSHIP 175-85 (1987) (presenting list and summa-
rizing data). Theodore Roosevelt and Thomas jefferson also have powerful associations 
with war, Roosevelt as a war hero during the Spanish-American War, and jefferson as the 
author of the Declaration of Independence and a leading Revolutionary War political 
figure. 
423 See Dean Keith Simonton, Presidential Greatness: The Historical Consensus and Its Psy-
chological Significance, 7 Poi.. PsvCHOL. 259, 270-71 (1986). 
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judicial nominees confirmed, and number of books published-cor-
responded with ranking.424 Other than years in office, the strongest 
predictor of positive ranking was years at war during the presi-
dency. 425 In other words, the more years in which the nation was at 
war during his presidency, the higher the President's rating was likely 
to be. Nothing any President did while in office had as great a positive 
effect as leading the nation in war. Surveying the relevant data, a 
range of other studies has also reached the conclusion that war years 
correlate with presidential greatness, as historians judge greatness.426 
This evidence suggests that the insight underlying the Founders' 
assignment of the power to start war to Congress, rather than the Pres-
ident, is at least as valid today as it was in 1787. Presidents' concern 
with their place in history still makes them likely to lead the nation to 
war. This explains, at least in part, why throughout the foreign affair 
crises in our history, in all but one case, Presidents have been more 
pro-war than Congress.427 
From the vantage point of constitutional law, the question be-
comes what effect should the continuing accuracy of the Framers' in-
sight have. For an originalist of the translation school, the current 
reality of the Framers' fear that Presidents are particularly likely to 
lead the nation to war means that the concrete original understand-
ing-that Congress alone should have the power to start war except in 
cases where it is necessary to repel sudden attacks-must be given ef-
fect. In other words, no changed circumstance warrants a re-alloca-
tion of power between the Executive and Congress. 
This insight about presidential self-interest is also relevant to cur-
rent constitutional discourse because it indicates that courts should 
not apply the political question doctrine to avoid resolving challenges 
to the constitutionality of Executive-initiated uses of force. Whether 
the political question doctrine currently exists at the Supreme Court 
level is an open question,428 but the United States District Court for 
424 See id. at 269-71. 
425 See id. at 273. 
426 See, e.g., Holmes & Elder, supra note 421, at 544, 546; David C. Nice, The Influence of 
War and Party System Aging on the Ranking of Presidents, 37 W. PoL. Q. 443 ( 1984); Hans W. 
Wendt & Paul C. Light, Measuring "Greatness" in American Presidents: A Model Case for Interna-
tional Research on Political Leadership, 6 EuR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 105 (1976). 
427 See Sidak, supra note 190, at 85-86. The one exception is President Grover Cleve-
land, who strongly and successfully opposed war with Spain in 1896. See id. at 86. Although 
President Adams opposed declaring war against France, despite a faction in Congress that 
wanted war, the clear majority of Congress opposed war-even among the Federalists. See 
Boston Patriot, supra note 185, at 305 n.2. (noting that Federalist congressional caucus voted 
against declaration of war). 
428 The classic statement of the political question doctrine is found in Baker v. Carr, 
369 u.s. 186 (1962). 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is 
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
1997] THE POWER TO DECLARE WAR 769 
the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Circuit court 
have both invoked the doctrine as the basis of decision in a series of 
cases in which they have dismissed suits seeking to overturn presiden-
tial decisions to send troops into combat.429 Courts in these cases 
have held that they would not resolve the constitutionality of presi-
dential actions because Congress had not affirmatively sought to block 
such actions. For example, in Lowry v. Reagan,430 Judge Revercomb 
explained that he would not reach the merits of the case because 
"[a]lthough styled as a dispute between the legislative and executive 
branches of government, this lawsuit evidences and indeed is a by-
product of political disputes within Congress regarding the applicabil-
ity ,of the War Powers Resolution to the Persian Gulf situation."431 
The Court in Dellums v. Bush432 reached a similar result, although 
it did not rely upon the political question doctrine. There, the district 
court held that the political question doctrine did not bar a suit chal-
lenging the military build-up that preceded Operation Desert 
Storm.433 Nonetheless, the court dismissed the case for reasons of 
ripeness which reflected concerns similar to those expressed in Lowry: 
"[U]nless the Congress as a whole, or by a majority, is heard from, the 
controversy here cannot be deemed ripe; it is only if the mcgority of 
the Congress seeks relief from an infringement on its constitutional 
war-declaration power that it may be entitled to receive it."434 These 
decisions reflect a view that Congress has adequate incentives and ade-
quate tools to protect its power under the War Powers Clause and 
that, if Congress does not act as a body, courts should not 
intervene.435 
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding with-
out an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discre-
tion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political deci-
sion already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question. 
ld. at 217. For the position that the doctrine is not followed at the Supreme Court level, 
see ELY, supra note 8, at 55; Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE 
LJ. 597 (1976). 
429 See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F.Supp. 
333 (D.D.C. 1987); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F.Supp. 893, (D.D.C. 1982), ajj'd per curiam, 
720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
430 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987). 
431 !d. at 338. 
432 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990). 
433 See id. at 1145-46. 
434 !d. at 1151. 
435 See also jESSE H. CHOPER,jUDICIAL REVIE\V AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAl. PROCESS: A 
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE RoLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 295-96 (1980) (argu-
ing that separation of powers disputes between the President and Congress should not be 
addressed by courts since the injured branch can defend itself politically). 
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The analysis in this Article indicates that this view is wrong. Presi-
dents have a personal motive for starting wars. The Founders gave 
Congress the power to decide when wars should start,- not because 
Congress has some countervailing and superior motive, but because 
Congress is, in contrast with the President, disinterested. The Foun-
ders believed that congressional representatives are too numerous to 
reap glory from war and therefore will fairly evaluate national interests 
in deciding whether to go to war. Moreover, Congress has no motive 
to try to stop the President from initiating conflict (as the failure of 
Congress to respond to presidential disregard of the War Powers Reso-
lution illustrates).436 Thus, a requirement imposed under the polit-
ical question doctrine that Congress exert itself before courts 
intervene leads to a result inconsistent with the Founders' vision: the 
President will assert authority that the Constitution has not given him 
and Congress will, in general, fail to counter by asserting its preroga-
tive. Congress will fail to assert its power under the War Powers 
Clause for the same reason that it was given that power-disinterest. 
This point leads back to the ultimate question: Did the Founders 
get it right? If Congress is disinterested, and the Executive, con-
cerned with his place in history, has a motive to bring the nation to 
war, who should make the decision? For the originalist-either a 
traditional originalist or a translation originalist-the question has 
been answered by the Founders. But for someone who views the origi-
nal understanding as not controlling, the question is more difficult. 
As noted, pro-Executive scholars have offered a range of no-
noriginalist reasons why the President should have the power to lead 
the nation into war.437 In contrast, pro-Congress scholars have not 
fully fought the battle on these terms. Although they have urged that 
it is wise to require congressional sanction for combat, they have gen-
erally placed primary reliance on Framers' intent.4 3S This Article has 
offered a new rationale justifying the pro-Congress position: that the 
President's desire for a place in history creates a bias in favor of war. 
Selfinterest in fame improperly skews decisionmaking. 
The point can be put even more broadly. Although the Framers' 
principal concern may have been the influence of the desire for glory, 
that concern can be generalized and re-framed as a concern that the 
President's self-interest creates a bias in favor of war. Although the 
desire for glory is highlighted, Madison's Helvidius letters reflect 
other factors that would influence a President to initiate war out of 
self-interest-"ambition, avarice, vanity."439 In current politics, the 
436 
437 
438 
439 
See supra text accompanying notes 65-68. 
See supra text accompanying notes 91-94. 
See supra text accompanying notes 95-103. 
Madison, "Helvidius" Number 4, supra note 35, at 108. 
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principal concern along these lines is that a President will recklessly 
bring the nation to war in order to win re-election.440 Although this 
concern may not have specifically worried the Framers, it has a long 
heritage, as some of the criticisms of the War of 1812 quoted above 
indicate.441 It is reasonable, therefore, to suspect that Presidents are 
inclined to favor war, and accordingly to withhold from them the 
power to lead the nation to war. 
Not everyone will find this new argument for giving Congress 
alone the power to initiate conflict compelling. The counter to this 
argument is as follows: just because Presidents may have personal rea-
sons to lead the nation to war does not mean that power should be 
withheld from them. It can be argued that Congress, in the absence 
of a personal motivation to go to war, favors war too rarely. A propo-
nent of this view might point, for example, to World War II and the 
GulfWar. In both instances, Congress was deeply divided whereas the 
President strongly favored war. Perhaps, in both instances, the Presi-
dent was right. Perhaps because war is so terrible, those who have no 
reason to favor it are too risk-averse. Our constitutional system is in 
large part based on the notion that self.interest can be harnessed for 
the national interest; this is but another example of how appropriate 
that approach is. In this regard, it is worth noting that Adair was 
urging that modern presidents concern themselves with fame, not 
·warning us against such a concern. 442 The argument would then run 
that, because Presidents seek to be remembered well by history, they 
are precisely the individuals who should be making the decision about 
whether the nation goes to war. 
Thus, for a nonoriginalist, this Article will not end the debate 
over who should have the power to start war. It will, however, bring a 
new concern and a new focus to that debate. 
CONCLUSION 
The extensive scholarly debate about the original understanding 
of the War Powers Clause thus far has been inconclusive. Previous 
440 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 8, at 8, 146 n.41 (noting fears in 1992 "that the executive 
might start a war to demonstrate toughness and 'leadership' in perilous political times"); 
Bobbitt, supra note 15, at 1383 (noting existence of belief that President Bush was moti-
vated by electoral concerns to start a war, although dismissing that belief as an "old ca-
nard"); Dennis Duggan, Church's Candle Flickers as Does the Hope for Peace, NEwsoAv,Jan. 10, 
1991, at 6 (claiming that Presidents Bush, Reagan, Nixon, and Johnson sought "the kind of 
war that gets a President re-elected"); Elizabeth Neuffer, AUies Assess the Possible Fallout, 
BoSTON Gr.osE, Sept. 6, 1995, at 11 ("[P]resident Clinton faces a tough re-election cam-
paign-and ... it is important to his image to he seen as forceful in Bosnia."); William 
Safire, Comeback Coming, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1992, at A25 (suggesting that a prominent 
dictator "is going to get zapped" in order to aid Bush re-election campaign). 
441 See supra Part III.D. 
442 See ADAIR, supra note 32, at 26. 
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writings in favor of the position that the Founders intended to give 
Congress alone the power to initiate conflict have suffered from a crit-
ical weakness: They have failed to offer a convincing explanation for 
why the Founders would have given that power to Congress when so 
many factors, including precedent and practical considerations, 
weighed in favor of giving the war-starting power to the President. 
This Article has advanced such an explanation: The Founders gave 
Congress the power to start war because they believed that Presidents, 
out of a desire for personal glory, would be too prone to war. This 
Article thus dramatically strengthens the originalist case for a pro-
Congress reading of the Clause. 
This Article is also significant in that it presents evidence that the 
Founders did not intend to give the President veto power over decla-
rations of war. Although the argument that the President lacks this 
power has previously been made on textualist grounds, it has not been 
made on originalist grounds. Indeed, where the possibility that the 
Founders did not intend to give the President this power has been 
raised, it has been rapidly dismissed. Substantial evidence indicates, 
however, that most of the Founders thought that the decision to go to 
war was exclusively vested in Congress, and this Article, by highlighting 
the Founders' distrust of the President's decisionmaking in this area, 
has made this position comprehensible. 
The argument presented here also has an important bearing on 
nonoriginalist debate about the proper meaning of the War Powers 
Clause. Because of their intellectual heritage, and because of the 
great glory that Washington achieved during the Revolutionary War, 
the Founders were particularly sensitive to the possibility that Presi-
dents, motivated by a desire to secure an important place in history, 
would lead the nation to war. Modem scholars, in debating the mean-
ing of the War Powers Clause, have lost sight of this concern. But 
strong evidence shows that this concern remains at least as relevant as 
it was two-hundred years ago. That is, modem presidents still tend to 
favor war because of their desire to be judged well by history. Recog-
nition of this point indicates that courts err when they invoke the 
political question doctrine in order to avoid resolving challenges to 
presidential actions committing troops to combat. More basically, it 
provides a powerful argument for why Presidents should not have the 
power to bring the nation to war. Although it is not an argument that 
everyone will find convincing, it is an argument that forces us to re-
examine a fear that animated the Founders, and which we have lost 
sight of over time. Yet it is a concern that continues to bear directly 
on the actions of those who occupy the most powerful office the Foun-
ders created. Even if we do not embrace the Founders' conclusions, 
we should admire their prescience. 
